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I. INTRODUCTION

“Piercing the corporate veil”—the phrase conjures up the
tantalising pursuit of an exotic being whose identity is shrouded in
mystery. Unfortunately, the guiding principles for judicial veil piercing
are almost as elusive as the creature behind the veil itself.
Every trial lawyer has experienced the thrill of obtaining a
money judgment after a long and hard-fought trial only to experience
the disappointment of learning that the corporate defendant is
bankrupt. The client is furious and demands to know what the lawyer
is going to do. The client asks: “Why can’t you go after the
shareholder?” Full of the bravado of victory, the lawyer reassures the
client that it can be done. But when the lawyer goes to the library and
looks up the case law, he comes away confused.
The question of what it takes to pierce the corporate veil is one
that should be of interest to all multinational corporations that engage
in international trade through local subsidiaries incorporated in other
countries. After all, one of the reasons that large listed companies
incorporate subsidiaries in other countries is to shield the holding
company from claims arising in the jurisdiction in which the subsidiary
is situated. The risk of the holding company incurring personal liability
for the debts of its foreign subsidiaries is therefore an important one
for parent companies to consider before commencing business
through a subsidiary in another country. The English law principles in
relation to corporate veil piercing are of international significance
because the corporate laws of many countries in the British
commonwealth are influenced by English law.
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This article primarily explores the principles that apply in the
quest to pierce the corporate veil under English and South African law.
In order to assist international lawyers advising multi-national
corporations, it also compares the laws of England and South Africa
with the laws of the United States. This comparative analysis shows
that all three legal systems are guided by similar principles, although
they have some differences. However, variations in outcome from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction may have more to do with the public policy
of the forum in which the matter is tried than real differences in
principle.
Veil piercing is an equitable remedy. As there is no end to
human ingenuity when it comes to concocting dishonest business
schemes, courts in the three subject jurisdictions have correctly
refrained from attempting to definitively state what the exact
parameters of the doctrine are. However, this understandable
reluctance has resulted in a case by case type of approach in all of the
subject jurisdictions that is not always consistent in its outcomes. One
Australian judge commented that “there is no common, unifying
principle, which underlies the occasional decision of the courts to
pierce the corporate veil. Although an ad hoc explanation may be
offered by a court which so decides, there is no principled approach to
be derived from the authorities. . . .” 1
This judicial observation may overstate the haphazard nature
of corporate veil piercing. Courts have laid down general principles as
to when this drastic remedy will be allowed. The application of the law
to the facts has however led to inconsistent results. These
inconsistencies have more to do with the public morals of the time
when, and the place where, piercing is sought. Nevertheless, many of
the outcomes are reasonably predictable.
The English courts have shown themselves to be very
conservative in going behind the veil. 2 In South Africa, under the
Briggs v James Hardie & Co Pty Ltd [1989] 16 NSWLR 549, 567 (Austl.). See
Amlin (SA) Pty Ltd. v. Van Kooij 2008 (2) SA 558 (C) at para. 15 (S. Afr.).
2 See generally Woolfson v. Strathclyde Reg’l Council [1978] SC 90 (HL) (Eng.)
(It “is appropriate to pierce the corporate veil only where special circumstances exist
indicating that it is a mere façade concealing the true facts.”); Adams v. Cape Industries
1
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influence of the nation’s new democratic Constitution, the general
principles have been liberalised, although successful veil piercing
remains a rarity. 3
The general principles applicable in the various American
jurisdictions are not inherently more liberal than those that apply in
South Africa. 4 However, an empirical study has shown that veil
piercing is one of the most litigated areas of corporate law in the United
States and that the plaintiff has been successful on average in
approximately 40% of reported cases. 5 Veil piercing claims also tend
to be more successful in specific states. 6
This article evaluates and compares the principles and cases
applicable to corporate veil piercing in England, South Africa and the
United States and attempts to identify, as much as possible, a common
thread that will unravel the veil. Part II of the article discusses the legal
principles applicable to veil piercing in the United Kingdom. Part III
reviews certain basic principles of South African common law and
corporate law as well as the legal principles applicable to veil piercing
in South Africa. Part IV contains a brief comparative overview of the
law of the various jurisdictions of the United States appertaining to veil
piercing. 7

PLC [1990] Ch 433 (Eng.) (rejecting the single economic unit concept of liability in
a corporate group and holding that there was no general principle that “all companies
in a group of companies are to be regarded as one.”); Ben Hashem v. Al Shayif [2009]
1 FLR 115 (Eng.) (In order for the court to pierce the corporate veil “it is necessary
to show both control of the company by the wrongdoer(s) and impropriety, that is,
(mis)use of the company by them as a device or façade to conceal their wrongdoing.”)
3 See Ebrahim v. Airport Cold Storage (Pty) Ltd. 2008 (6) SA 585 (SCA) at 594
para. 22 Ex Parte Gore NO 2013 (3) SA 382 (WCC) at 396 para. 28.
4 See generally DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc. v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co., 540 F.2d
681 (4th Cir. 1976); Lowendahl v. Balt. & Ohio R.R., 287 N.Y.S. 62 (N.Y. App. Div.
1936), aff’d, 6 N.E.2d 56 (N.Y. 1936); Japan Petroleum Co.v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 456 F.
Supp. 831 (D. Del. 1978).
5
Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study,
CORNELL 76 L.REV. 1036, 1048 (1991).
6 Id. at 1050–1054. (indicating that the percentage of successful veil piercing
cases in CA was 45% but 0% in Delaware).
7
Citations in this Article to South African judgments are mainly to cases
reported in various published South African Law Reports, which are obtainable both
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As the outcomes in veil piercing cases are fact driven, this
article includes comprehensive analysis of the facts of many of the
cases in an effort to extract general principles.
II. PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL IN ENGLAND
A. The Concept of Juristic Personality
Importantly, “[a] registered company is a legal persona distinct
from the members who compose it.” 8 This means that the assets of
the company vest in the company and not its shareholders. Usually,
the shareholders of the company have no liability for the company’s
debts. 9
Laurence Cecil Bartlett Gower, 10 arguably the most
authoritative writer on English company law, notes that one of the
primary purposes for the introduction of the limited liability company
in England during the mid-nineteenth century was to “facilitate the
investment by members of the public, who were not professional
investors, of their surplus funds in the many large capital projects,”

online and in hard copy. There are also references to certain cases that are not
reported in the ordinary Law Reports but appear on websites such as Southern
African Legal Information Institute (“SAFLII”) or Judgments Online (“JOL”). Cases
that have the letters “CC” at the end of the citation were decided by the South
African Constitutional Court. Cases that have the acronym “SCA” are decided by the
South African Supreme Court of Appeal. References to “ZASCA” are SCA cases
reported only on the SCA’s website. References to “AD” are references to the
Appellate Division, the previous name of the Supreme Court of Appeal. The article
also contains references to English cases. A reference to “All ER” is a reference to
the All England Law Reports. A reference to “QB” is a reference to the Queen’s
Bench.
8 Dadoo Ltd. v. Krugersdorp Mun. Council 1920 AD 530, 550 (S. Afr.); Cape Pacific
Ltd. v. Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Ltd. 1995 (4) SA 790 (AD) at 802F (S. Afr.);
Salomon v. Salomon & Co. [1897] AC 22 (HL) (Eng.).
9 Airport Cold Storage (Pty) Ltd. v. Ebrahim 2008 (2) SA 303 (C) at 306 para. 6
(S. Afr.).
10
P.B. Morice, Obituary: Professor Laurence Gower, INDEPENDENT (Feb. 12,
1998, 1:02 AM), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/obituaries/obituaryprofessor-laurence-gower-1144314.html.
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such as the construction of railways. 11 Public investors lacking
expertise in administering companies would be considerably
discouraged from buying shares in those companies “if the full range
of their personal assets were to be put at risk.” 12
Furthermore, limited liability “facilitates the operation of
public securities markets, because it relieves the investor of the need
to be concerned about the personal wealth of fellow investors.” 13
As the whole purpose of limited liability is to afford
shareholders/investors (who may or may not be closely associated
with the company) the benefit and protection of limited liability, the
courts in modern mercantile jurisdictions are naturally reluctant to
pierce the corporate veil and declare shareholders liable for the debts
of the companies in which they have invested. This is particularly so
where the company’s members own publicly traded securities. 14 The
entire modern investment structure and the fluidity of investment
funds is premised upon limited liability. It stands to reason that courts
will only venture to pierce the corporate veil in the most extreme
situations.
One of the earliest attempts to pierce the corporate veil in
England arose in the seminal case of Salomon v. Salomon & Co. Ltd. 15 In
that case, a trader sold a solvent business to a limited liability company
with a nominal capital of 40,000 shares of £1 each, the company
consisting only of the vendor, his wife, a daughter and four sons, who
11
PAUL L. DAVIES ET AL., GOWER’S PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY
LAW 191–92 (10th ed. 2016) [hereinafter GOWER’S PRINCIPLES].
12 Id. at 192.
13 Id. (citing Halpern et al., An Economic Analysis of Limited Liability in
Corporation Law, 30 U. TORONTO L.J. 117 (1980)).
14 See GOWER’S PRINCIPLES, supra note 11, at 206; THOMPSON, supra note 5,
at 1054–56. Apart from the court’s policy aversion to piercing the corporate veil in
listed companies, the requisites for corporate veil piercing of listed companies in any
jurisdiction are in any event unlikely to be present because: (i) it is rare for any one
person or entity to dominate a listed company so completely that it would justify
piercing the corporate veil; and (ii) publicly traded companies are heavily regulated
so that instances of undercapitalisation and failure to observe corporate formalities
are likely to be rare.
15
Salomon v. Salomon & Co. [1897] AC 22 (HL).
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subscribed for one share each. 16 All the terms of the sale were known
and approved by the shareholders. 17
As partial payment of the purchase price for the business,
debentures forming a floating security were issued to the vendor,
Salomon. 18 Over 20,000 shares were also issued to him and were paid
for out of the purchase-money. 19 These shares gave the vendor the
power to outvote the six other shareholders. 20 No shares other than
these 20,007 were ever issued. 21 All requirements of the Companies
Act 1862 were complied with. 22 The vendor was appointed managing
director. 23 Bad times came, and the company was wound up (i.e. placed
in bankruptcy). 24 After satisfying the debentures there was not enough
to pay the ordinary creditors. 25
After the company went into liquidation (i.e. an English form
of bankruptcy), the liquidators (i.e. English corporate bankruptcy
trustees) lodged a defence to a claim by the shareholder/vendor,
Salomon, to enforce the debentures that had been issued to the
company and brought a counter-application seeking to have Salomon
indemnify the creditors of the company for the company’s losses. 26
The liquidators were initially successful in the lower court. 27
However, the House of Lords held that Salomon was a completely
separate entity from the company, with the result that the debentures
were enforceable. 28 Salomon could not be held personally liable for the
debts of the company. 29 The liquidators sought to argue that Salomon
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29

Id. at 22.
Id. at 23.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Salomon v. Salomon & Co. [1897] AC 22 (HL) at 23.
Id. at 24–26.
Id. at 26.
Id. at 30–33.
Id. at 23.
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was the dominant personality in the company and that his coshareholders, who were all family members with a minority
shareholding, were in effect not real shareholders but were simply
issued shares to enable the company to comply with the relevant
statute which required seven shareholders. 30
The principal judgment of the court was delivered by Lord
Halsbury. 31 He reasoned that the company in bankruptcy was a valid
“artificial creation” of the Legislature (in the form of the Companies
Act of 1862)32 and had been validly constituted. 33 As long as the
company was properly constituted, the court could not add
requirements for a valid corporation that were not in the statute. 34
“[T]here were seven actual living persons who held shares in the
company” as was required by the Companies Act. 35 The statute did not
require that any one of the seven shareholders hold more than one
share or that they hold the shares in various proportions. 36 The fact
that Salomon was the dominant shareholder and that the other
shareholders generally did his bidding did not render him personally
liable for the debts of the company. 37 Even if the formation of the
company was “a mere scheme to enable Aron Salomon to carry on
business in the name of the company[,]” that would not be contrary to
the intent of the Companies Act. 38
Lord Halsbury emphasised that a company that was “legally
incorporated . . . must be treated like any other independent person
with its rights and liabilities appropriate to itself[;]” the incorporators’

Id. at 28–29.
Id. at 29–34. Lord Halsbury was one of England’s greatest jurists and the
first editor of Halsbury’s Laws of England. 1 Halsbury’s Laws of England: 5th Ed:
(2008) Introduction.
32
i.e. the Companies Act of 1862.
33 Id. at 29.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36
Salomon v. Salomon & Co. [1897] AC 22 (HL) at 30.
37 Id. at 30–31.
38 Id.
30
31
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motives are not relevant to an evaluation of “what those rights and
liabilities are.” 39
Lord Watson added that, even if Salomon formed the
company in order to limit his liabilities, he simply “availed himself to
the full of the advantages offered by the Companies Act [of] 1862” and
that there was nothing wrong with that. 40 This was a perfectly
legitimate use of corporate personality.
In short, creditors of a company who chose to deal with the
company, instead of the individual shareholder behind the company,
cannot later be heard to complain that the incorporator should be
denied the benefits of the limited liability even when that is the very
reason that he incorporated the company. Despite the fact that a
company is an entity separate and distinct from its members, there are
times when the court will pierce or lift the corporate veil to have regard
to the identity of the shareholders behind it.
In Atlas Maritime Co. SA v. Avalon Maritime Limited The Coral
Rose (No 1), the English court distinguished between “piercing” the
corporate veil and “lift[ing]” it. 41 The veil is “pierce[d]” where the
rights or liabilities of a company are treated as the rights or liabilities
of the shareholders. “Lift[ing]” the corporate veil or “look[ing] behind
it” occurs when the court, “for some legal purpose,” has regard to the
identity of the shareholders in the company. 42
In Atlas Maritime, a subsidiary company had borrowed money
from its parent to purchase and repair a damaged vessel. 43 The plaintiff
obtained a Mareva injunction 44 to freeze the subsidiary’s assets to
Id. at 30.
Id. at 51–52.
41
Atlas Maritime Co. SA v. Avalon Maritime Ltd. [1991] 4 All ER 769.
42 Id. at 779.
43 Id. at 769.
44 Id. A Mareva injunction is an English form of injunction, the parameters
of which were first enunciated in Mareva Cia Naviera SA v. Int’l Bulkcarrier SA
(“The Mareva”) [1975] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 509. In certain circumstances, the court will
grant an injunction pending litigation to prevent the defendant from disposing of
those assets until the litigation is concluded. See COLIN B. PREST, THE LAW AND
PRACTICE OF INTERDICTS 103–19 (1996).
39
40
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protect them from dissipation. 45 The holding company, as a loan
creditor of the subsidiary, sought to lift the injunction so the debt owed
to it could be repaid by the subsidiary. 46 The court held that this was
not a case for piercing the corporate veil in the sense of saddling the
holding company with the liability of the subsidiary. 47 However, the
court could lift the veil and look behind the debtor company and
determine that the creditor was in fact the parent of the debtor
company that had been enjoined. 48 Once the identity of the
shareholder was recognised and the holding company and creditor
were revealed as one and the same, the repayment could not be said to
be a repayment in the ordinary course of business and the injunction
could not be lifted. 49 As appears from the cases cited below, courts in
England and in South Africa have been far more willing to lift the veil
than they have been to pierce it. 50
Daimler Co. Ltd. v. Continental Tyre and Rubber Company (Great
Britain) Limited was one of the earliest cases in which an English court
pierced or lifted the corporate veil. 51 The case came before the Privy
45

769.

Atlas Maritime Co. SA v. Avalon Maritime Ltd. [1991] 4 All ER 769 at

Id.
Id. at 779.
48 Id. at 779–80.
49 Id. at 779–81.
50 See generally Gilford Motor Co. v. Horne [1933] Ch 935 (CA) (Eng.)
(looking behind the veil to prevent a shareholder who had signed a non-compete
agreement with the plaintiff from effectively conducting business in violation of the
restraint through a company). Le’Bergo Fashion CC v. Lee 1998 (2) SA 608 (C) (S. Afr.);
Die Dros (Pty) Ltd. v. Telefon Beverages CC 2003 (4) SA 207 (C) at 215 para. 24 (S. Afr.);
Jones v. Lipman [1962] 1 All ER 442 (disregarding the separate legal personality of
the company where the company was used to avoid a contractual obligation); Cape
Pacific Ltd. v. Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Ltd. 1995 (4) SA 790 (AD) (S. Afr.) ;
Daimler Co. v. Cont’l Tyre & Rubber Co. [1916] 2 AC 307 (HL) (Eng.) (holding that
a company whose shareholders were enemy German nationals was an “enemy”
trading with England in violation of war regulations); Ebrahimi v. Westbourne
Galleries Ltd. [1972] 2 All ER 492 (HL) (Eng.) (recognizing in a shareholder dispute
that there were shareholders behind the company with “rights, expectations and
obligations inter se which are not necessarily submerged in the company structure”);
Erasmus v. Pentamed Investments (Pty) Ltd. 1982 (1) SA 178 (W) (S. Afr.) (following the
approach of the House of Lords in Ebrahami when it held that a closely held
corporation was in substance a partnership).
51
Daimler Co. v. Cont’l Tyre & Rubber Co. [1916] 2 AC 307 (HL) (Eng.).
46
47
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Council during the First World War. The court held that a company
incorporated in England, whose majority shareholders were all
German nationals residing in Germany, was an enemy “alien.” 52 As a
result, the company could not sue for payment of a debt owed to it
that arose before the war commenced because the defendant was not
permitted to “pay any sum of money to or for the benefit of an
enemy.” 53
Lord Halsbury, enunciated the general principle that “when the
object to be obtained is unlawful the indirectness of the means by
which it is to be obtained will not get rid of the unlawfulness. . . .” 54
The court held that in that case “the object of the means adopted [was]
to enable thousands of pounds to be paid to the King’s enemies.” 55
The general principle stipulated above is the foundation upon
which successful English veil piercing cases have been based right up
to the present day. This principle is entirely consistent with the body
of jurisprudence that the English Courts have developed with regard
to corporate veil piercing. However, the application of the general
principle to the facts of the cases is not always uniform.
Lord Halsbury 56 reasoned that: (i) before the war commenced
“an associated body of Germans availed themselves of our English law
to carry on a business for manufacturing motor car tyres in Germany
and selling them here in England. . . .” 57 At that time there was nothing
wrong with the shareholders’ action because Germany and England
were at peace; 58 (ii) however, after the war commenced the plaintiff
company became little more than the “machinery” to accomplish an
illegal purpose of “giving money[] to the enemy” 59 (i.e. Germany); (iii)
Id. at 316.
Id. at 332.
54 Id. at 315. Note how similar the language is to that of the South African
court in: Kilburn v. Estate Kilburn 1931 AD 501 at 507; Zandberg v. Van Zyl 1910 AD
302 at 309; Dadoo Ltd. v. Krugersdorp Mun. Council 1920 AD 530 at 544–548.
55
Daimler Co. v. Cont’l Tyre & Rubber Co. [1916] 2 AC 307 (HL) at 315.
56
Halsbury also wrote the principal judgment in Salomon v. Salomon & Co.
[1897] AC 22 (HL).
57
Daimler Co. v. Cont’l Tyre & Rubber Co. [1916] 2 AC 307 (HL) at 315.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 316.
52
53
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the company was not a living thing capable of loyalty and disloyalty. 60
Accordingly, the court looked to the shareholders to determine the
enemy character of the company and concluded that the shareholders
constituted a partnership in all but name; 61 (iv) the court therefore set
aside the veil to conclude that the company was being utilised as the
machinery for performing an illegal purpose. 62
Lord Halsbury then concluded:
[I]t seems to be too monstrous to suppose that for an
unlawful, because, after a declaration of war, a hostile,
purpose [a corporate] institution should be used, and
[the] enemies of the State, while actually at war with us,
be allowed to continue trading and actually to sue for
their profits in trade in an English court of justice. 63
The emotive language used by Lord Halsbury 64 suggests that
the court’s decision may have been motivated more by patriotism than
principle. The assertion that the plaintiff’s shareholders sought to
obtain an unlawful object by an indirect means 65 is simply not borne
out by the facts. All actions by the plaintiff and its shareholders took
place before the war and were legal. 66 The company was incorporated
and credit was extended to the defendant before the war had
commenced. 67 The notion that a company can be an enemy merely
because its shareholders are enemy nationals is antithetical to the basic
principle of corporate law — that the company is an entity separate
and distinct from its shareholders. 68 The time to stop payment to the
“enemy” would have been when the company attempted to declare a

Id.
Id. at 316.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64
Phrases such as “the King’s enemies,” “monstrous to suppose” and
“enemies of the State” Id.
65 Id. at 308.
66 Id. at 315.
67
Daimler Co. v. Cont’l Tyre & Rubber Co. [1916] 2 AC 307 (HL) at 308.
68
Ironically this doctrine was first enunciated by Lord Halsbury himself in
Salomon v. Salomon & Co. [1897] AC 22 (HL) at 30.
60
61
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dividend, not when it sought to recover a debt that was owing to it by
a third party.
The Daimler case is of importance for a number of reasons.
First, it is probably the first case in which the House of Lords actually
set aside or pierced the corporate veil and is therefore a landmark
judgment. Second, it enunciated the general principle that, where a
corporation is being used to circumvent the law, it is appropriate to
pierce or set aside the veil.
However, in evaluating the case in relation to a particular
modern fact pattern with which any legal practitioner is presented, it is
important to remember that the case is more of a product of its time
than a reliable pointer as to how a court will find in future cases. The
manner in which Lord Halsbury applied the law to the facts in the
context of a war situation demonstrates the extent to which the
ultimate outcome of corporate veil cases may be driven by public
policy and the social milieu of the time.
B. Subsidiary Companies in a Group and The Agency Principle
During the second half of the twentieth century, the English
courts flirted with a different approach to corporate veil piercing where
the companies under consideration were part of a corporate group and
the ultimate shareholder of those companies was also a corporation. 69
In that context, the courts allowed voluntary veil piercing (i.e. veil
piercing sought by the shareholders themselves) on the basis that: (i)
the subsidiary company was a mere agent of the holding company; 70 or
(ii) the companies in the group were a “single,” “economic entity” and
were in substance a partnership. 71

69 See generally Smith, Stone & Knight Ltd. v. Lord Mayor [1939] 4 All ER
116; DHN Food Distributors Ltd. v. London Borough of Tower Hamlets [1976] 3
All ER 462.
70 See Smith, Stone & Knight Ltd. v. Lord Mayor [1939] 4 All ER 116 at 120–
22.
71
DHN Food Distributors Ltd. v. London Borough of Tower Hamlets
[1976] 3 All ER 462 at 467, 473.
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In Smith, Stone and Knight Limited v. Lord Mayor, Aldermen and
Citizens of the City of Birmingham the court pierced the corporate veil to
assist shareholders in a company, not to hold them liable for the
corporation’s debt. 72 This is sometimes referred to as a “reverse
piercing of the veil,” 73 although voluntary piercing may be a better
term.
The claimant, Smith, Stone & Knight Limited (“Smith”)
owned a property in the City of Birmingham. 74 Smith had a subsidiary
called the Birmingham Waste Company Limited (“the Waste
Company”) which carried on business on the premises for the benefit
of Smith. 75 The subsidiary company (i.e. the Waste Company) was
technically the entity that carried on business on the premises. 76 The
City of Birmingham wanted to purchase the property under its
compulsory expropriation powers in order to build a technical
college. 77 In an effort to maximise the compensation to which Smith
(the ultimate holding company) would be entitled, Smith made a claim
for compensation, asserting that the subsidiary (which carried on
business on the premises) was merely its agent and that the true owner
of the business was Smith. 78 The court upheld Smith’s claim on the
basis that the Waste Company was a mere agent of Smith with no
independent business of its own. 79
In concluding that the Waste Company was the agent of
Smith, 80 the Court utilised a series of questions that were usually used
in tax cases: 81 (i) were the profits of the subsidiary reported as the
profits of the holding company? (ii) “were the person[s] conducting
the business appointed by the parent company?” (iii) was the holding
company the “head and brain of the trading venture?” (iv) did the
Smith, Stone & Knight Ltd. v. Lord Mayor [1939] 4 All ER 116.
Al-Kharafi & Sons v. Pema 2010 (2) SA 360 (W) at 380 para. 30 (S. Afr.)
(citing “Joubert (ed) The Law of South Africa (first reissue) vol 4(1) para 42”).
74 Id. at 117.
75 Id. at 118.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 117.
78 Id. at 118.
79 Id. at 121.
80 Id.
81 Id.
72
73
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holding company “govern the venture, decide what should be done”
and what capital should be invested? (v) did the holding company
“make the profits by its skill and direction?” (vi) was the holding
company “in effectual and in constant control?” 82
Some of the factors that influenced the court in concluding
that the Waste Company was an agent of Smith, were that the
claimants kept all of the books and accounts of the Waste Company,
“[t]here was no tenancy agreement of any sort” between Smith and the
Waste Company, no rental payments, and, although the Waste
Company was debited a pro rata share of the overheads this amounted
to nothing more than a mere book entry. 83
It is important to emphasise that Smith resolved the case on the
basis that the Waste Company was a mere agent of the claimant, Smith,
so that the business that the Waste Company carried on was in
substance the business of Smith. 84
The principles enunciated in Smith are at first blush appealing
when a creditor of a subsidiary seeks to impress liability upon a
company that is the sole shareholder of that subsidiary company. As
the purpose of forming a business as a limited liability company is to
protect individuals who choose to invest their capital in the company,
one may well ask why a corporate holding company should have the
same protections.
However, in the Smith case, the court was not piercing the
corporate veil in order to satisfy the claim of a jilted creditor of the
subsidiary. The court was piercing the veil to assist the very
Id. at 121. Cf. Hamilton v. Water Whole Int’l Corp. 302 Fed. App’x 789, 794–
95 (10th Cir. 2008).
83
Smith, Stone & Knight Ltd. v. Lord Mayor [1939] 4 All ER 116 at 119–
20.
84 Id. at 120–21, This agency principle resonates and bears similarity with
American law. See Irwin & Leighton v. WM Anderson Co. 532 A.2d 983, 987 (Del. Ch.
1987) (“First the dominant corporation must have controlled the subservient
corporation and second, the dominant corporation must have proximately caused
plaintiff harm through misuse of this control.”); Japan Petroleum Co. v. Ashland Oil,
Inc., 456 F. Supp. 831, 839–40 (D.Del. 1978); Pacific Can Co. v. Hewes 95 F.2d 42, 45–
46 (9th Cir. 1938).
82
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shareholders that had created the corporate structure in the first place
presumably because the court thought it seemed unfair to deprive
them of fair compensation arising out of the expropriation. This seems
to be an unsound basis for coming to the rescue of the shareholders.
One might well ask whether the court would have been as quick to
pierce the corporate veil of the subsidiary to saddle liability on the
holding company for a debt of the subsidiary. Where shareholders
choose to hold property through a company, they have the benefit of
limited liability, they should also have to suffer whatever disadvantages
that may cause. Nevertheless, the agency principle may be an
appropriate way to saddle the holding company with liability to a
creditor to the extent that the courts will recognise it again in the
future.
A similar situation arose in DHN Food Distributors Limited v.
London Borough of Tower Hamlets. 85 That case also addressed a claim for
compensation for expropriation by the City of London. The property
was owned by a company called Bronze, which was a wholly owned
subsidiary of the claimant, DHN. DHN could not obtain
compensation for the disruption of its business unless it could lift the
corporate veil and treat Bronze as its alter ego. 86 In a fairly robust
judgment, Lord Denning, without referring at all to Smith, Stone &
Knight, held that the veil should be lifted and that the holding company
should be permitted to claim compensation for business disruption. 87
The reverse veil piercing that took place in DHN Food was
accomplished with less analysis than in Smith, Stone & Knight. There
was no attempt to hold that Bronze was a mere agent of DHN. 88

DHN Food Distributors Ltd. v. London Borough of Tower Hamlets
[1976] 3 All ER 462.
86 Id. at 462–63.
87 Id. at 467.
88
This agency principle resonates and bears similarity with United States
law. See Irwin & Leighton v. WM Anderson Co. 532 A.2d 983, 987 (Del. Ch. 1987) (“First
the dominant corporation must have controlled the subservient corporation and
second, the dominant corporation must have proximately caused plaintiff harm
through misuse of this control.”); Japan Petroleum Co. v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 456 F. Supp.
831, 839–40 (D.Del. 1978); Pacific Can Co. v. Hewes 95 F.2d 42, 45–46 (9th Cir 1938).
85
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The decision in DHN Food is of particular significance because,
for the first time, it espoused the “single economic entity theory”—
that companies in a group that were treated as one for the purpose of
general accounts, balance sheets and profit and loss accounts were
effectively a partnership and should be treated as one and the same
entity. 89 Lord Denning cited with approval to the well-known English
company law academic, Gower, who had said that: “there is evidence of
a general tendency to ignore the separate legal entities of various
companies within a group, and to look instead at the economic entity
of the whole group.” 90
The decision in DHN Food has been criticised in other cases in
other jurisdictions. In Pioneer Concrete Services Limited v. Yelnah (Pty) Ltd.
and Others, an Australian court noted that DHN Food “gives one the
impression that it is one of those ‘too hard’ cases in which judges have
for policy reasons justified the lifting of the corporate veil in that
particular case rather than the case which lays down any great new
principle.” 91 Piercing the corporate veil should be limited to situations
where there is in fact and in law a partnership between companies in a
group, or alternatively, where one of the companies is a mere “sham”
or “façade.” 92
A similar situation came before the House of Lords in Woolfson
v. Strathclyde Regional Council. 93 This case also examined a claim for
compensation from a regional council for expropriation where the real
business was carried on by a holding company and not by the property
owning subsidiary. 94
Although the claimants in Woolfson initially attempted to rely
on Smith, Stone & Knight, they subsequently abandoned this argument
89
DHN Food Distributors Ltd. v. London Borough of Tower Hamlets
[1976] 3 All ER 462 at 467.
90 Id.
91 Pioneer Concrete Services Ltd V Yelnah (Pty) Ltd (1986) 11 ACLR 108, 118–19
(NSW).
92 Id. See also Ord v. Belhaven Pubs Ltd. [1998] 2 BCLC 447 (CA) at 456–57
(Eng.)); Al-Kharafi & Sons v. Pema 2010 (2) SA 360 (W) at 383–84 para. 35 (S. Afr.).
93
Woolfson v. Strathclyde Reg’l Council 1978 SLT 159 (HL) (Scot.).
94 Id. at 159–60.
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because theirs was not a clear case of agency. 95 However, they relied
heavily on DHN Food, contending that the relevant companies “should
all be treated as a single entity.” 96 The claim was unsuccessful. 97
In delivering its judgment, the House of Lords was critical of
DHN Food, although it distinguished it on the facts. 98 The court
expressed “some doubts” that in DHN Food Lord Denning “properly
applied the principle that it is appropriate to pierce the corporate veil
only where special circumstances exist indicating that there is a mere
fa[ç]ade concealing the true facts.” 99
This criticism of DHN Food is directed more towards the
appropriateness of allowing a voluntary or reverse veil piercing than to
the agency theory of liability. The whole concept of piercing the
corporate veil is a device invented by the courts to prevent abuse of
corporate personality in a manner that adversely prejudices third
parties. It is ironic that the English courts have shown a greater
willingness to invoke the agency principle to assist shareholders with a
reverse or voluntary veil piercing than to apply it for the benefit of
aggrieved third-party creditors of the company who have been left high
and dry by a corporate structure that somehow squeaks through as
genuine. 100
The issue of group liability and the single economic entity
theory came up for consideration by the English Court of Chancery in
the landmark case of Adams v. Cape Industries PLC. 101 The case arose
out of asbestos tort litigation initiated against an American company,
NAAC. 102 NAAC was a subsidiary of the defendant, Cape Industries
Id. at 161.
Id.
97 Id. at 162.
98 Id. at 161–62.
99 Id. at 161.
100
The American “instrumentality” doctrine, which is intended to benefit
third parties, requires that the behaviour of the majority shareholder is the proximate
cause of the injury or loss complained of. See Lowendahl v. Balt. & Ohio R.R., 247 A.D.
144, 156 (N.Y. App. Div. 1936), aff’d, 6 N.E. 2d 56 (N.Y. 1936); Irwin & Leighton v.
WM Anderson Co. 532 A.2d 983, 987–88 (1987).
101
Adams v. Cape Indus. PLC [1991] 1 All ER 929.
102
Id. at 929, 936.
95
96
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PLC. 103 Cape Industries had a subsidiary called Cape Asbestos South
Africa (Pty) Ltd (“CASAP”), a South African company, which mined
asbestos in South Africa. 104
NAAC was an Illinois registered company that was formed for
the purpose of marketing the asbestos products of CASAP in the
United States. 105 Although NAAC was a subsidiary of Cape Industries,
it conducted business independently. 106 It did its own marketing and
had its own board and its own set of accounts. 107 It paid U.S. taxes. 108
For purposes of its judgment, the court accepted that NAAC
had been formed for the purpose of marketing asbestos in the United
States because Cape Industries did not wish to expose itself to potential
tort claims in the United States arising out of the purchase of
asbestos. 109 There was no evidence that Cape Industries exercised
control over the commercial activities of NAAC. 110 Although Cape
Industries directed the level of dividend paid by NAAC and the level
of permitted borrowing, the court held that “[s]uch corporate financial
control was no more and no less than was to be expected in a group
of companies such as the Cape Group.” 111 There was no agency
agreement between Cape Industries and NAAC. 112 NAAC did not
have authority to represent Cape Industries in any transactions. 113
At some point, Cape Industries had registered a company in
Lichtenstein, Associated Mineral Corp (“AMC”), which it interposed
between itself and NAAC. 114

103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114

Id. at 935–36.
Id. at 936–37.
Id. at 935–36.
Id. at 1027.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1025–26.
Id. at 1028.
Adams v. Cape Indus. PLC [1991] 1 All ER 929, at 995.
Id. at 1028.
Id.
Id. at 994.
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The plaintiff sued Cape Industries in Texas claiming damages
for injury caused by exposure to asbestos dust emanating from an
asbestos installation factory to which NAAC had supplied raw
asbestos. 115 Cape Industries took the position that it had no presence
in Texas or in the United States and that, accordingly, the Texas court
had no jurisdiction over it. 116 Cape Industries therefore chose not to
defend the lawsuit. 117 A default judgment was obtained, and the
plaintiffs sought to enforce the judgment in England. 118
Cape Industries defended the lawsuit initiated in England and
maintained that the Texas court judgment could not stand against it
because the Texas court had lacked personal jurisdiction. 119 The
question of whether the court had jurisdiction was to be decided under
English law. 120 English law would probably recognize jurisdiction over
an overseas trading company when it was present within the
jurisdiction of the court in the sense that it had “established and
maintained at its own expense . . . a fixed place of business of its own
in the [relevant] country and for more than a minimal period of time
ha[d physically] carried on its own business at or from such premises
by its servants or agents. . . .” 121
The central issue in Adams was, therefore, whether Cape
Industries, through NAAC, had established a presence in the United
States. 122 If NAAC was the defendant’s agent in the United States or
its alter ego, Cape Industries’ presence in the United States would be
established and the judgment would be valid. 123 The court concluded
that NAAC was not the defendant’s agent in the United States or its
alter ego. 124

115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124

Id. at 987–90.
Id. at 989, 991–92.
Id.
Id. at 989, 991.
Id. at 992.
Id. at 1000.
Adams v. Cape Indus. PLC [1991] 1 All ER 929, at 1014.
Id. at 1000, 1014–15.
Id. at 999–1005.
Id. at 1016–30.
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First, the court considered the “single economic unit”
argument and resoundingly rejected it. The court held that “[t]here is
no general principle that all companies in a group of companies are to
be regarded as one.” 125 “On the contrary, the fundamental principle is
that ‘each company in a group of companies (a relatively modern
concept) is a separate legal entity possessed of separate legal rights and
liabilities.’” 126
Next, the court considered whether it was appropriate to pierce
the corporate veil. The court held that the authorities afforded little
guidance on the principles to be utilised in deciding whether the
“arrangements of a corporate group involve[ed] a façade. . . .” 127 The
court expressly refrained from “attempt[ing] a comprehensive
definition of those principles. 128
The court held that AMC, the Lichtenstein company that been
interposed between Cape Industries and NAAC, was “clearly a
façade[,]” the “creature of Cape” and “no more than a corporate
name.” 129 Accordingly, it could be ignored and the court could deal
with the matter as if the direct relationship of parent and subsidiary
was between Cape Industries and NAAC. 130 It was accordingly
irrelevant whether AMC was a façade. The real question was whether
NAAC was a façade or “creature of Cape.” 131
The court found that NAAC was a separate company
conducting its own operations independently in the United States. 132
On its face, NAAC was not a façade. 133 The question was whether the
legal position changed because NAAC was incorporated for the
specific purpose of insulating Cape Industries’ potential claims arising

125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133

Id. at 1016.
Id. (quoting The Albazero [1975] 3 All ER 21 at 28).
Adams v. Cape Indus. PLC [1991] 1 All ER 929 at 1025.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1025–26.
Id. at 1025.
Id. at 1026.
Id.
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out of consumers of asbestos in the United States. 134 The court found
that this did not change the position. 135
The court reasoned as follows: (i) there was no suggestion that
there was any “actual or potential illegality or . . . inten[tion] to deprive
any one of their existing rights[;]” (ii) whether or not the course
adopted by Cape Industries “deserve[d] moral approval”, there was
nothing illegal about the way Cape Industries organised its affairs; (iii)
the fact that the company had deliberately organised its affairs so as to
minimise its potential tortuous liability did not justify piercing the
corporate veil. 136
In short, the fact that Cape Industries was itself a corporation
did not prevent it from insulating itself from liability by trading
through a subsidiary any more than Salomon was prevented from
doing so in Salomon v Salomon & Co. For purpose of piercing the
corporate veil, there was no difference in principle between a corporate
or individual shareholder.
Having rejected the argument that the corporate veil should be
pierced, the court then considered whether NAAC was a mere agent
of Cape Industries. 137 If it was, the holding company, Cape Industries,
could be liable for debts incurred by its agent on its behalf. In other
words, the court implicitly accepted that a holding company can be
held liable for the debts of its subsidiary on an agency principles and
that such liability could arise independently of whether the subsidiary
was a fraud, a façade or a sham. 138
The court concluded that NAAC was not a mere agent of Cape
Industries. 139 In reaching its conclusion, the court pointed to the
following factors: (i) NAAC was itself the lessee of the premises from
which it operated, paid rental to the landlord, owned its own office
furniture, employed its own staff and ran its own pension scheme; (ii)
134
135
136
137
138
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Id.
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Id. See Salomon v. Salomon & Co. [1897] AC 22 (HL).
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it conducted business “activities as principal on its own account,”
among other things, buying asbestos from the United States
Government and a source in Japan and selling them to United States
customers; (iii) it stored the asbestos that it purchased from US
Government stocks in warehousing facilities in its own name which it
paid for; (iv) it earned profits and paid US taxes; (v) it paid dividends;
and (vi) it observed all corporate formalities. 140
It is interesting to note how closely the factors relied on by the
English court compare with the “template” of factors often considered
by American courts in deciding whether to pierce the corporate veil. 141
The Adams court then noted:
There is no doubt that the services rendered by NAAC
in acting as intermediary in respect of contracts
between the United States customers and Egnep or
Casap were active and important services which were
of great assistance to Cape/Capasco in arranging the
sales of their group’s asbestos in the United States.
Nevertheless, for all the closeness of the relationship
between Cape/Capasco and NAAC, strictly defined
limits were imposed on the functions which NAAC
were authorised to carry out or did carry out as their
representative. First, NAAC had no general authority
to bind Cape/Capasco to any contractual obligation.
Second, . . . there is no evidence that NAAC, whether
with or without prior authority from Cape/Capasco,
ever effected any transaction in such manner that
Cape/Capasco thereby became subject to contractual
obligations to any person. 142
An interesting feature of the judgment from the perspective of
English corporations with subsidiaries doing business in the United
Id. at 1027.
See generally DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc. v. W. Ray Fleming Fruit Co. 540 F.2d
681 (4th Cir. 1976); Japan Petroleum Co. v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 456 F. Supp. 831 (D.Del.
1978).
142
Adams v. Cape Indus. PLC [1991] 1 All ER 929 at 1028.
140
141
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States is that the English court chose to resolve the issue of veil
piercing and agency under English law rather than under the law of the
U.S. state in which the subsidiary, NAAC, was incorporated. In coming
to this conclusion, the court reasoned that, in deciding whether to
enforce a foreign judgment in England, the court had to consider
whether English law recognised that Cape Industries had acquired a
physical presence of its own in Illinois. 143 In essence, the court appears
to have treated the issue as more one of procedure than substance.
The Cape Industries case is a landmark decision in England and
reflects the current state of the law on this issue. The South African
courts have also adopted the reasoning of the English Chancery
Division in Cape Industries in approaching the liability of a holding
company for the acts of its subsidiaries. 144
The reasoning of the court in Cape Industries, while
conservative, is consistent with the more recent curbs placed upon the
“single economic entity” approach to groups of companies by the
House of Lords in Woolfson v. Strathclyde Regional Council. 145 However,
reading between the lines, another factor motivating the court in Cape
Industries may have been a concern about opening the floodgates to
foreign tort claims (especially from the U.S.) against English holding
companies. In this connection, the Chancery Division was so critical
of the manner in which the Texas judge dealt with the computation of
the damages that it held that even if the corporate veil could have been
pierced, the Texas judgment could not be enforced in England because
there had not been a proper judicial assessment of the damages. 146 This
indicates yet again that the courts are frequently influenced in veil
piercing cases by what they perceive to be public policy considerations.

Id. at 999–1000.
Wambach v. Maizecor Indus. (Edms) Bpk 1993 (2) SA 669 (A) at 675 D-E;
Macadamia Finance Bpk v. De Wet 1993 (2) SA 743 (A) at 748 C-E (In both Wambach
and Macadamia, the courts refused to pierce the veil and to treat the holding company
and its subsidiaries as a single economic entity); Al-Kharafi & Sons v. Pema 2010 (2)
SA 360 (W) at 386 para. 36.
145 See generally Woolfson v. Strathclyde Reg’l Council (1978) S.L.T. 159.
146
Adams v. Cape Indus. PLC [1991] 1 All ER 929 at 1047–50.
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Some academic writers maintain that tort claimants should be
able to proceed against shareholders because, after all, they did not deal
with the subsidiary voluntarily. 147 However, there is a fallacy in this
argument; veil piercing occurs because there has been fraud or
improper conduct on the part of the shareholder in relation to a known
third party, usually a creditor. Many torts do not involve unlawful
conduct on behalf of the shareholder. On the other hand, if the
shareholder is a party to the tort, the shareholder would be liable with
the subsidiary on ordinary principles of tort law. 148 This may be why
cases in which tort claimants have been able to pierce the corporate
veil are harder to find in any jurisdiction, even the United States. 149
It is also interesting how similar Cape Industries was to the
approach of the U.S. Federal Court in Japan Petroleum Co. (Nigeria) Ltd.
v. Ashland Oil 150 when it rejected a claim arising out of Nigeria against
a U.S. holding company for the debt of its Nigerian subsidiary engaged
in oil exploration in Nigeria. 151
It is important to note that, in reaching its conclusion, the Cape
Industries court did not reject the agency theory of holding company
liability; 152 it simply imposed tighter restrictions on when it could be
applied. There is still scope for the agency principle where, for
example, the subsidiary company is itself merely an investment holding
company conducting no business activities of its own.
Cape Industries was the death knell for the “single economic
entity theory” of corporate groups in England. However, many lawyers
may well mourn its passing. The purpose of conferring limited liability
on companies was to enable individuals to invest in companies without
FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW 69–71 (2d ed. 2010).
See generally Lowendahl v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. 241 A.D. 156 (N.Y. App. Div.
1936), aff’d 6 N.E. 2d 56 (N.Y. 1936).
149
THOMPSON, supra note 5, at 1058–59; GEVURTZ, supra note 147 at 73.
150 See generally Japan Petroleum Co. v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 456 F. Supp. 931 (D.Del.
1978).
151 See generally Craig v. Lake Asbestos of Quebec Ltd., 843 F.2d 145 (3d Cir. 1988)
(refusing to pierce the corporate veil in order to enable asbestos the plaintiffs who
had claims against Cape Industries to pierce the corporate veil to hold Cape
Industries’ New Jersey holding company liable for the debts of Cape Industries).
152 See Adams v. Cape Indus. PLC [1991] 1 All ER 929 at 1025–1030.
147
148
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putting their private assets at risk. 153 It is hard to see how this purpose
is served by protecting holding companies from the insolvency of their
subsidiaries because, even when the holding company is held liable for
the debts of the subsidiary, the personal assets of the ultimate
shareholders in the holding company (who may be individuals) are not
placed at risk.
At the same time, the sacrosanct principle that a company is an
entity that is separate and distinct from its shareholders is violated
when the court fails to apply the law uniformly in the case of both
individual and corporate shareholders. Another difficulty with the
single economic entity theory is that its application significantly
increases the business risk for multi-nationals where a subsidiary is
located in a different country from the holding company as was the
case in Cape Industries. 154
All in all, when one weighs up the factors for and against the
single economic entity theory, the decision in Cape Industries makes
sense from both a legal and a policy perspective because it stresses that
a company is an entity separate and distinct from its shareholders.
C. The Company as a Façade or a Sham
Another category of cases in which the English courts have
pierced or gone behind the veil are those in which the court holds that
the company is a mere “façade” or a “sham” calculated to carry out an
improper purpose. 155 Many of these are characterised by a robust
expression of distaste by the court for the conduct of the defendant
and a lack of careful jurisprudential reasoning. The result is a perceived
lack of consistency in outcomes and a failure to set out clear

153
154

1978).

GOWER’S PRINCIPLES, supra note 11, at 191–92.
See generally Japan Petroleum Co. v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 456 F. Supp. 831 (D.Del.

See generally Gilford Motor Co. v. Horn [1933] Ch 935 (CA); Jones v.
Lipman [1962] 1 All ER 442 at 445; Wallersteiner v. Moir [1974] 3 All ER 217 at 237;
Creasey v. Breach Wood Motors Ltd. [1993] BCLC 480; Gencor ACP Ltd. v. Dalby
[2000] 2 BCLC 734 (Ch. D.).
155

140

The Mystery of the Corporate Veil

2019

7:1

jurisprudential guidelines. As the cases are not always consistent, it is
important that their facts be analysed individually. 156
In Gilford Motor Company Limited v. Horne, the court looked
behind the veil to prevent a shareholder who had signed a noncompete agreement with the plaintiff from effectively conducting
business in violation of the restraint through a company. 157 The court
granted an injunction against both the shareholder (who had signed
the non-compete undertaking) and the company that he was using to
conduct business in an effort to circumvent the restraint. 158 The Court
held that the company that Horne had formed was “a mere cloak or a
sham” to enable him to “engage in business” in violation of the noncomplete clause. 159 Consequently, the court granted an injunction
against the company as well as Horne, the defendant who had formed
it as a vehicle to enable him to evade the provisions of the restraint. 160
It bears mentioning that, as robust as the court appeared to be
in Gilford Motor Company, it did not go so far as to pierce the corporate
veil to hold a shareholder liable for the debts of its subsidiary. It is also
questionable whether it was necessary for the court to look behind the
corporate veil at all to justify granting an injunction against the
company which was in any event a party to the defendant’s breach of
the non-complete clause. 161
In Jones v. Lipman, the first defendant agreed to sell freehold
land with registered title to the plaintiffs for £5,250. 162 Upon
completion, the first defendant “sold and transferred the land to the
second defendant company (having a capital of £100). . . .” 163 The first
defendant and his solicitors were the sole shareholders and directors
Look at how similarly the reasoning of the federal district court in
Delaware was. See generally Japan Petroleum Co. v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 456 F. Supp. 831 (D.
Del. 1978).
157
Gilford Motor Co. v. Horne [1933] Ch 935 (CA).
158 Id. at 935.
159 Id. at 956.
160 Id. at 965.
161
See the commentary of the court in VTB Capital PLC v. Nutritek Int’l
Corp. [2012] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 313 (CA) at 325–26.
162
Jones v. Lipman [1962] 1 All ER 442.
163 Id. at 442.
156
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of the second defendant company. 164 The second defendant company
purchased the land for £3,000, “of which £1,564 was borrowed by the
defendant company from a bank and the rest remained owing to the
first defendant.” 165
The plaintiffs successfully sued for a decree of specific
performance against both defendants to compel them to transfer the
land concerned to the plaintiffs. 166 The court followed Gilford Motor
Company Limited v. Horne 167 and Smith v. Hancock 168 in holding that the
company was “a device and a sham, a mask” that concealed the
shareholders’ actions from “the eye of equity[.]” 169
Accordingly, Jones v Lipman was similarly a case in which the
court went behind the veil, not to impose liability for a debt of the
company, but to prevent the first defendant from using the company
as a “sham” or a “mask” to effectively perpetrate a fraud against the
plaintiffs. 170
The reasoning in Jones v. Lipman is terse, robust and to the
point. 171 There is an absence of detailed reasoning demonstrating yet
again that the court’s conclusion was based more on fact than law. The
court considered the actions of the Defendants so repulsive to equity
that the remedy seemed obvious. 172
libel.

173

In Wallersteiner v. Moir, the plaintiff sued the defendant for
The defendant had asserted that certain corporate transactions

Id.
Id.
166 Id. at 445.
167
Gilford Motor Co. v. Horne [1933] Ch 935 (CA).
168
Smith v. Hancock [1894] 2 Ch 377.
169
Jones v. Lipman [1962] 1 All ER 442 at 445.
170 Id. at 444–45. In Cape Pacific Ltd. v. Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Ltd.
1995 (4) SA 790 (AD), the South African court granted a similar order in similar
circumstances.
171 See Jones v. Lipman [1962] 1 All ER 442 at 444–45.
172 See id. This approach is very similar to the approach followed by the South
African Chief Justice in Dadoo Ltd. v. Krugersdorp Mun. Council 1920 AD 530, 547 (“[A]
transaction is in fraudem legis when it is designedly disguised so to escape the
provisions of the law, but falls in truth within these provisions.”).
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Wallersteiner v. Moir [1974] 3 All ER 217 (Eng).
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were fraudulent. In the process of delivering judgment in favour of the
defendant, Lord Denning MR pierced the corporate veil. He held:
It is plain that Dr Wallersteiner used many companies,
trusts, or legal entities as if they belonged to him. He
was in control of them as much as any ‘one-man
company’ is under the control of the one man who
owns all the shares and is the chairman and managing
director. He made contracts of enormous magnitude
on their behalf on a sheet of notepaper, without
reference to anyone else. . . . He used their moneys as
if they were his own. When the money was paid to him
for shares which he himself owned beneficially, he
banked it in the name of IFT of Nassau. . . . His
concerns always used as their bankers the AngloContinental Exchange Ltd. That was a merchant bank
in the City of London of which he was chairman and
which he effectively controlled. . . . Even so, I am quite
clear that they [the companies,] were just puppets of
Dr Wallersteiner. He controlled their every movement.
Each danced to his bidding. He pulled the strings.
Noone else got within reach of them. Transformed
into legal language, they were his agents to do as he
commanded. He was the principal behind them. I am
of the opinion that the court should pull aside the
corporate veil and treat these concerns as being his
creatures–for whose doings he should be, and is,
responsible. At any rate, it was up to him to show that
any one else had a say in their affairs and he never did
so. . . . 174
The colourful descriptive language utilised by Lord Denning
and the offhand way in which he concluded that the veil should be
pierced perhaps demonstrates that in many cases where the corporate
Id. at 237–38. It is also interesting to note how similar Lord Denning’s
list of relevant factors is to the American instrumentality doctrine. See generally DeWitt
Lowendahl v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. 247 A.D. 156 (N.Y. App. Div. 1936), aff’d, 6 N.E. 2d
56 (N.Y. 1936).
174
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veil is pierced the shareholder’s behaviour is so obviously wrong that
is requires very little reasoning to hold him responsible for the acts of
his corporation. Even so, this is not a case in which the corporate veil
was pierced to render Dr. Wallersteiner liable for the debts of one of
his companies but rather to get to the substance of whether he was
behaving dishonestly.
In Snook v. London and West Riding Investments Ltd. 175 the court
defined the term “sham” in the veil piercing context as “acts done or
documents executed by the parties to the ‘sham’ which are intended
by them to give to third parties or to the court the appearance of
creating between the parties legal rights and obligations different from
the actual legal rights and obligations . . . which the parties intended to
create.” 176 The court held that for a transaction to be a “sham” the
parties must have “a common intention” that their acts or documents
are intended to in fact create different legal rights and obligations to
those that they appear to create. 177
In Yukong Line Limited of Korea v. Rendsburg Investments Corp. of
Liberia (No 2), 178 the court applied the doctrine enunciated above in
Snook’s case. In that case, the plaintiff had contracted with the first
defendant, RIC. An individual, Yamvrias controlled RIC. 179 After RIC
breached its charter party contract with the plaintiff, Yamvrias caused
RIC to transfer its cash assets, totalling $244,965.60, to another
company that he controlled, LIC. 180 The plaintiff sought to pierce the
corporate veil and hold Yamvrias and LIC liable for RIC’s debt. The
court refused to pierce the corporate veil because it concluded that the
charter party contract between the parties was not a sham. 181
The approach of the court in Yukong Line is too literal. The
question should not be whether the charter party contract was a

at 528.

175

Snook v. London and West Riding Investments Ltd. [1967] 1 All ER 518

176

Id.
Id.
Yukong Line Ltd. v. Rendsburg Investments Corp. [1998] 4 All ER 82.
Id. at 86.
Id. at 82, 86.
Id. at 95.

177
178
179
180
181

144

The Mystery of the Corporate Veil

2019

7:1

genuine transaction but whether the transfer of funds from an
insolvent company by the shareholder to another company that was
also his puppet warranted piercing the corporate veil. The answer to
that question should have been yes.
In The “Tjaskemolen” (now named “Visvliet”), 182 the court held
that, where ownership of a sailing vessel had been transferred from A
company to B company to avoid the ship being attached to satisfy the
debt of the A company, the transfer was a sham or a façade. 183 The
basis of the court’s decision was that the transfer itself was a sham and
therefore ownership had not passed. 184 Accordingly, this case was not
about veil piercing as much as setting aside a simulated transaction.
Nevertheless, the court, in the process of delivering its judgment,
seemed to rely in part upon cases in which the corporate veil was
pierced. 185
The decision in Tjaskemolen can be juxtaposed against that of
the court in Yukong Line. It was the transfer of assets to frustrate an
attachment that was held to be a sham. The question of whether the
underlying contract between the plaintiff and the original defendant
was valid was irrelevant. In comparison, in Yukong, the court focused
on the genuineness of the original contract between the plaintiff and
the defendant rather than the transfer of assets which stripped the
defendant of the ability to satisfy its obligations to the plaintiff. 186 For
reasons stated above, it is my opinion that the reasoning in Tjaskemolen
is more likely to be correct than that in Yukong Line.
In Creasey v. Breachwood Motors Limited, 187 the defendant had
divested itself of all of its assets in favour of another company owned
by the same shareholders. 188 The transferee of the assets agreed to be
responsible for all of the trade debts of the transferor company but not
The “Tjaskemolen” (now named “Visvliet”) [1997] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 465.
Id. at 474.
184 Id. at 474–75.
185 Id. at 469–71; In Re A Company [1985] 1 B.C.C.99; Creasey v.
Breachwood Motors Ltd. [1993] BCLC 480.
186
Yukong Line Ltd. v. Rendsburg Investments Corp. [1998] 4 All ER 82 at
95.
187
Creasey v. Breachwood Motors Limited [1993] BCLC 480.
188 Id. at 482–83.
182
183
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the plaintiff’s claim against the transferor company for wrongful
dismissal. 189 The court pierced the corporate veil to enable the plaintiff
to obtain satisfaction of his debt from the transferee company. 190
In Ord v. Belhaven Pubs Limited, the court disapproved of the
decision in Creasey. 191 In that case, the plaintiff, the legal owners of a
public house, had transferred all of the land from which it conducted
its operations to its holding company as part of a restructuring in which
the land owned by various subsidiaries conducting various public
house businesses was transferred to the holding company. 192 The
plaintiff contended that this left the defendant company as a shell
unable to satisfy the plaintiff’s debt, and the plaintiff sought to pierce
the corporate veil. 193 The court refused to pierce the corporate veil,
noting that the plaintiff had not pointed to any actual improprieties or
fraud on the part of the defendant or its holding company. 194 Yet, in
the absence of impropriety or fraud, it was not necessary for the court
to distinguish Creasey because that was a case where the transaction
occurred with the deliberate intention of frustrating the plaintiff’s
rights.
In Gencor ACP Limited v. Dalby, 195 the plaintiffs brought an
action against D and M, the former director and company secretary,
respectively, of a group of companies, “alleging misfeasance on their
part in misapplying money and other property belonging to the ACP
Group. . . .” 196 The unlawful profits made by the director had been
channelled through Burnstead Limited, a British Virgin Islands
company controlled by one of the director defendants, Dalby. 197 The
Chancery Division pierced the corporate veil and held that those

189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197

Id.
Id. at 491–93.
Ord. v Belhaven Pubs Ltd. [1998] 2 BCLC 447 (CA).
Id. at 447, 450–51.
Id. at 453.
Id. at 456.
Gencor ACP Ltd. v. Dalby [2000] 2 BCLC 734 (Ch.D.).
Id. at 734–35.
Id. at 739, 742 paras. 10, 19.
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profits that had accrued to Burnstead were in fact profits of the
director defendant, Dalby. 198
The delinquent director, Dalby, argued that he was not
accountable to the plaintiff company, ACP, for the commission
because he did not receive it personally. 199 It went instead to Burnstead,
a separate company. 200 Burnstead he argued, was not in a fiduciary
relationship to ACP. 201
The court rejected this argument. 202 The court noted that
Burnstead was wholly owned by Dalby and that “nobody else had any
beneficial interest.” 203 Burnstead had no “sales force, technical team or
other employees capable of carrying on any business.” 204 All it did was
make and receive payments. In effect, it was nothing more than
“Dalby’s offshore bank account held in a nominee name.” 205
The court concluded that Burnstead was simply Dalby’s alter
ego and agent and that the corporate veil should be “lift[ed]” with the
result that Burstead must pay the funds over to the plaintiff
company. 206
Once again, this is not a case in which the corporate veil was
pierced or lifted in order to hold the shareholder liable for the debts of
a puppet company. On the contrary, it is a case where the corporate
veil was set aside in order to hold the puppet company liable for the
debts of the shareholder. The case is consistent with the decision in
Adams that held that one of the subsidiary companies of the defendant,
Cape Industries, that had been interposed between the defendant and
its American subsidiary was a façade because it conducted no business
activities of its own for its own account.

198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206

Id. at 734–735.
Id. at 744 para. 25.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 744 para. 26.
Id.
Id.
Gencor ACP Ltd. v. Dalby [2000] 2 BCLC 734 (Ch.D.) at 744 para. 26.
Id.
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A similar situation arose in Trustor AB v. Smallbone (No 2). 207
The defendant, Smallbone, was the managing director of a company,
Trustor. 208 In breach of his fiduciary duty, he caused Trustor to transfer
funds to Introcom Limited, a company which he controlled. 209 The
plaintiff argued that the circumstances warranted the court “piercing
the corporate veil” and recognising that the receipt of funds by
Introcom was a receipt of funds by Smallbone. 210 The court held that
the authorities cited to it permitted the corporate veil to be pierced
“where the company was shown to be a fa[ç]ade or sham with no
unconnected third party involved.” 211 It then held:
In my view these conclusions are such as to entitle the
court to recognise the receipt of the money of Trustor
by Introcom as the receipt by Mr Smallbone too.
Introcom was a device or fa[ç]ade in that it was used as
the vehicle for the receipt of the money of Trustor. Its
use was improper as it was the means by which Mr
Smallbone committed unauthorised and inexcusable
breaches of his duty as a director of Trustor. 212
The decisions in Gencor and Trustor are consistent. They
indicate that where a director, acting in breach of his fiduciary duty,
uses another entity that he controls as a vehicle to misappropriate
funds or seize a corporate opportunity, the court will pierce the
corporate veil to ensure that no injustice is done to the company. 213
In view of the apparent inconsistencies in outcomes in the
cases set out in the subsection above it may seem hard to extrapolate
a general principle. However, some central principles can be extracted.
Trustor AB v. Smallbone [2001] 3 All ER 987.
Id. at 987, 989.
209 Id. at 990 paras. 4–8.
210 Id. at 987 and 995 para. 23, 996.
211 Id. at 993 para. 14,994 para. 20.
212 Id. at 995–96 para. 25.
213
This was also the approach of the South African court in Robinson v.
Randfontein Estates Gold Mining Co. 1921 AD 168 at 194, where the court treated a
trust (not a corporation) as the alter ego of the defendant Robinson who had seized
a corporate opportunity from Randfontein Estates Gold Mining Company and
diverted it to a trust that he controlled.
207
208
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First, in cases where a company has been set up in order to enable an
individual or a company to escape a contractual obligation, the court
will usually go behind the veil and look at the shareholder who is
behind the company that is being used to commit the subterfuge. 214
Second, in most of the cases referred to in this section in which the
plaintiff was successful, the court did not declare the shareholder liable
for the debts of the company. Rather, the court went behind the façade
of the company and held the company liable or responsible for the acts
of its shareholders. So, for example, in Gilford Motor Company 215 and
Jones v Lipman, 216 the court identified the company with the shareholder
to prevent the shareholder from using the company to circumvent a
contractual obligation. Similarly, in Gencor 217 the court required a
company to repay money that a shareholder had misappropriated from
another company in breach of his fiduciary duty as a director.
Lastly, Certain of these cases, however, have adopted a more
conservative approach, showing a willingness to go behind the veil
only where the original transaction is a sham. 218 In these cases, the
court declined to examine a subsequent transaction by which one of
the defendants disposed of assets to a related party defendant, taking
the position that, because the underlying transaction was valid, the
second transaction was irrelevant.
D. Summary of the English Law Principles
The state of the English law with regard to corporate veil
piercing has been well summarised in Ben Hashem v. Al Shayif. 219 The
court, in matrimonial proceedings, was asked to pierce the corporate
veil in order to hold that a property in which the wife resided that was

See generally Gilford Motor Co. v. Hall [1933] Ch 935 (CA); Jones v.
Lipman [1962] 1 All ER 442; Gencor ACP Ltd. v. Dalby [2000] 2 BCLC 734 (AC);
Trustor AB v. Smallbone [2001] 3 All ER 987; The “Tjaskemolen” (now named
“Visvliet”) [1997] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 465.
215
Gilford Motor Company Limited v. Hall [1933] Ch 935 (CA).
216
Jones v. Lipman [1962] 1 All ER 442.
217
Gencor ACP Ltd. v. Dalby [2000] 2 BCLC 734 (AC).
218
Snook v. London & West Riding Investments Ltd. [1967] All ER 518;
Yukong Line Ltd. v. Rendsburg Investments Corp. [1998] 4 All ER 82.
219
Ben Hashem v. Al Shayif [2009] 1 FLR 115.
214
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owned by a corporation was in fact property of the husband. 220 The
husband was not the sole shareholder in the company—his children
also held shares. 221 The husband had respected the separate corporate
personality of the company, and all monies that he borrowed from the
company were reflected as borrowings. 222 The court refused to pierce
the corporate veil. 223 In reaching its conclusion the court emphasised,
as many other cases have, that there was no intrinsic virtue or “magic”
in the term “façade” which is usually now used to connote “an outward
appearance or front, especially a deceptive one[.]” 224 The term cannot
be used to cover up a failure of proper legal analysis.
The court then set out the following rules for piercing the
corporate veil:
In the first place, ownership and control of a company
are not of themselves sufficient to justify piercing the
veil. . . . Secondly, the court cannot pierce the
corporate veil, even where there is no unconnected
third party involved, merely because it is thought to be
necessary in the interests of justice. . . . Thirdly, the
corporate veil can be pierced only if there is some
“impropriety”. 225 Fourthly, the court cannot, on the
other hand, pierce the corporate veil merely because
the company is involved in some impropriety. The
Id. at 115, 134–35.
Id. at 115, 163.
222 Id. at 163–66.
223 Id. at 167. Cf. Cattlebreeders Farm (Pvt) Ltd. v. Feldman 1974 (1) SA 169
(RAD) at 169 F-G, 171 E-H (S. Afr.)(piercing the corporate veil in a matrimonial
case where the matrimonial home was owned by a company of which the husband
was a 100% shareholder); Gering v. Gering 1974 (3) SA 358 (W), 358 H, 359 A-B, 361
A-H (S. Afr.) (compelling in a matrimonial suit a company of which the husband was
the sole shareholder and through which he conducted his business to make discovery
of financial documents that were relevant to the divorce proceeding). As no fraud or
impropriety was alleged or shown, it is questionable whether these South African
cases are consistent with the current state of the South African law, which is analysed
below.
224
Ben Hashem v. Al Shayif [2009] 1 FLR 115 at 153; Atlas Maritime Co.
SA v. Avalon Maritime Ltd. [1991] 4 All ER 769 at 779.
225
This language is similar to the language used by the court in Cape Pacific
Ltd. v. Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Ltd. 1995 (4) SA 790 (AD) at 803 C-E.
220
221
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impropriety must be linked to the use of the company
structure to avoid or conceal liability. . . . Fifthly, it
follows from all this that if the court is to pierce the
veil it is necessary to show both control of the company
by the wrongdoer(s) and impropriety, that is, (mis)use
of the company by them as a device or façade to
conceal their wrongdoing. . . . Finally, and flowing
from all this, a company can be a façade even though
it was not originally incorporated with any deceptive
intent. 226 The question is whether it is being used as a
façade at the time of the relevant transaction(s). And
the court will pierce the veil only insofar as it is
necessary to provide a remedy for the particular wrong
which those controlling the company have done. In
other words, the fact that the court pierces the veil for
one purpose does not mean that it will necessarily be
pierced for all purposes. 227
The statement that “the court will pierce the veil only insofar
as is necessary to provide a remedy for the particular wrong which
those controlling the company have done” has been regarded as
erroneous. 228 In VTB Capital, 229 the court rejected a submission that
there was “no such principle as ‘piercing the veil[.]’” Having regard to
prior decisions, including Woolfson v. Strathclyde Regional Council 230 and
Adams v. Cape Industries PLC 231 the court held that it was no longer open
to it “to question the existence of the ‘veil piercing’ principle.” 232

See id. at 804 B.
Id. at 154–55.
228
Antonio Gramsci Shipping Corp. v. Stepanovs [2011] EWHC 333
(Comm) at 652–653 paras. 18–21; VTB Capital PLC v. Nutritec Int’l Corp. [2012]
EWCA 808 (Civ.) at 329 para. 79, 330 para. 82; Ex Parte Gore 2013 (3) SA 382 (WCC)
at 392 para. 22.
229
VTB Capital PLC v. Nutritec Int’l Corp. [2012] EWCA 808 (Civ.) at 322
paras. 48–49.
230
Woolfson v. Strathclyde Reg’l Council 1978 SLT 159.
231
Adams v. Cape Industries PLC [1990] Ch 433.
232
VTB Capital PLC v. Nutritec Int’l Corp. [2012] EWCA 808 (Civ.) at 322
paras. 48–49.
226
227
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An analysis of the cases demonstrates that in recent years, the
English courts have approached corporate veil piercing in a more
conservative manner; the English courts consider the company to be
an important instrument for commerce and will not easily go behind
the veil. 233 The courts have shown themselves less reluctant to pierce
the corporate veil where this will not result in holding a shareholder
liable for the debt of the company that it controls. 234 The courts are
also more willing to pierce the corporate veil to saddle a company with
the liability of its shareholder in order to assist a plaintiff company to
recover funds that were transferred to another entity controlled by one
of the plaintiff’s directors in breach of the fiduciary duties of that
director. 235
The fact that the shareholder sought to be held liable for the
debts of the corporation is a company not an individual does not make
the claim to pierce the corporate veil any stronger. 236 The concept that
companies in a group constitute a single economic unit should be
treated as one that has now been rejected. 237 There is still room for the
argument that a holding company may be liable for the debts of its
subsidiary where the subsidiary does no business of its own and is
simply a conduit or agent for the activities of the holding company. 238

233 See GOWER’S PRINCIPLES, supra note 11, at 197–206; Salomon v. Salomon
& Co. [1897] AC 22 (HL) at 29–31; Woolfson v. Strathcylde Reg’l Council 1978 SLT
151 at 161; Adams v. Cape Industries PLC [1991] 1 All ER 929.
234 See generally Daimler Co. v. Cont’l Tyre & Rubber Co. [1916] 2 AC 307;
Gilford Motor Co. v. Horne [1933] Ch 985 (CA); Jones v. Lipman [1962] 1 All ER
442.
235 See generally Gencor ACP Ltd. v. Delby [2000] 2 BCLC 734; Trustor AB
v. Smallbone [2001] 3 All ER 987.
236 See Adams v. Cape Industries PLC [1991] 1 All ER 929 at 1016.
237 See Woolfson v. Strathclyde Reg’l Council 1978 SLT 159; Adams v. Cape
Industries PLC [1991] 1 All ER 929at 1016.
238 See generally Smith, Stone & Knight Ltd. v. Lord Mayor [1939] 4 All ER
116; Adams v. Cape Industries PLC [1991] 1 All ER 929 at 1025; Gencor ACP Ltd.
v. Delby [2000] 2 BCLC 734; Trustor AB v. Smallbone [2001] 3 All ER 987; Rehana
Cassim, The Legal Concept of a Company, in CONTEMPORARY COMPANY LAW 52–53
(Farouk HI Cassim ed., 2011).
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III. PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL IN SOUTH AFRICA
South African common law is essentially Roman-Dutch in
origin but is influenced by English law, especially where Roman-Dutch
law required further development in order to bring it into line with
modern economic structures. 239
A. Equity in South African Law
Generally speaking, South African courts are not courts of
equity and are not usually empowered to apply equitable principles. 240
However, where the common law or statute specifically calls for or
contains an equitable principle, the court will be empowered to employ
that concept. 241
In approaching corporate veil piercing, the South African
courts have utilised an old Roman law maxim plus enim valet quod agitur
quam quod simulate concipitur — “that which is done is of more avail than
that which seems to have been done.” 242 To put it in more modern
terms, a court will give effect to the substance rather than to the form
of a transaction. For the sake of convenience, I will refer to this
principle as “the doctrine of simulation.”

239 See H.R. HAHLO & ELLISON KAHN, THE SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL
SYSTEM AND ITS BACKGROUND 590–596 (1968); FRANÇOIS DU BOIS ET AL., WILLE’S
PRINCIPLES OF SOUTH AFRICAN LAW 64–76(François du Bois ed., 9th ed. 2007);
Rood v. Wallach 1904 TS 187, 201; Conradie v. Rossouw 1919 AD 279 at 280–82; Minister
of Justice v. Hofmeyr 1993 (3) SA 131 (AD) at 154–55; Haynes v. Kingwilliamstown Mun.
1951 (2) SA 371 (AD) 378–80 (following English law in determining when it would
be appropriate to grant an order of specific form after a contract had been breached).
240 See Weinerlein v. Goch Buildings Ltd. 1925 AD 282, 295.
241
See generally Brisley v. Drotsky 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA), where the defendant
was held bound by an “entrenchment clause” in a written contract that provided that
there could be no amendments to the contract, or cancellation thereof unless they
complied with specific formalities. The defendant sought to avoid the consequences
of the entrenchment clause because it was in the circumstances, unreasonable, unfair
and in conflict with the principles of bona fides. The court held that it could not apply
equitable principles or principles of bona fides to allow the defendant to escape the
consequences of his bargain.
242 R.D. Claassen: Dictionary of Legal Words and Phrases: 2nd Ed: [1997] Vol 3: P60.
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In Kilburn v. Estate Kilburn, 243 the court held: “[i]t is a well known
principle of our law that Courts of law will not be deceived by the form
of a transaction: [they] will rend aside the veil in which the transaction
is wrapped and examine its true nature and substance.” 244
In Zandberg v. Van Zyl, 245 South Africa’s newly established
Appellate Division attempted to define the doctrine of simulation as
follows:
Now, as a general rule, the parties to a contract express
themselves in language calculated without subterfuge
or concealment to embody the agreement at which
they have arrived. They intend the contract to be
exactly what it purports; and the shape which it
assumes is what they meant it should have. Not
frequently, however (either to secure some advantage
which otherwise the law would not give, or to escape
some disability which otherwise the law would
impose), the parties to a transaction endeavour to
conceal its real character. They will call it by a name, or
give it a shape, intended not to express but to disguise
its true nature. And when a Court is asked to decide
any rights under such an agreement, it can only do so
by giving effect to what the transaction really is; not
what in form it purports to be. The maxim then applies
plus valet quod agitur quam quod simulate concipitur. But the
words of the rule indicate its limitations. The Court
must be satisfied that there is a real intention, definitely
ascertainable, which differs from the simulated
intention. For if the parties in fact meant that a contract
shall have effect in accordance with its tenor, the
circumstances that the same object might have been

Kilburn v. Estate Kilburn 1931 AD 501.
Id. at 507; Cf. Daimler Co. v. Cont’l Tyre & Rubber Co. [1916] 2 AC 307
at 332 (Eng.).
245 Zandberg v. Van Zyl 1910 AD 302.
243
244
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attained in another way will not necessarily make the
arrangement other than it purports to be. 246
It may seem anachronistic, but this ancient Roman law
doctrine that was enunciated more than a millennium ago is the legal
and equitable basis for piercing the corporate veil in modern South
African company law. 247 Simulation is as old as law and commerce. The
simple application of this doctrine helps to unpack the mass of case
law that seeks to explain whether the corporate veil should or should
not be pierced. When this principle is applied in the context of
corporate veil piercing it can explain why it is perfectly acceptable for
a business person to use a corporate structure to avoid personal liability
for the debts of the company provided that he keeps the corporate
structure separate from his own affairs. Where the shareholder and the
subsidiaries are comingled, it may then be appropriate to give effect to
the substance over the form. 248
Although the approach of the South African courts to the
application of equity (as opposed to legal) principles has not officially
changed in recent times, the enactment of South Africa’s first
democratic constitution, the Constitution of the Republic of South
Africa Act 108 of 1996 (“the Constitution”), has made it theoretically
possible to broaden the scope of equity based on Constitutional
principles. It has certainly encouraged the South African judiciary to
adopt a less legalistic approach. In this respect, Section 39(2) of the
Constitution requires that “when developing the common law or
customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit,
purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.” 249

Id. at 309.
See Cape Pacific Ltd. v. Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Ltd. 1995 (4) SA
790 (AD) at 802 H-J; Dadoo Ltd. v. Krugersdorp Mun. Council 1920 AD 530, 547.
248 Cape Pacific Ltd. v. Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Ltd. 1995 (4) SA 790
(AD) at 802; Ex Parte Gore NO 2013 (3) SA 382 (WCC) at 398 para. 33.
249
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996,
section 39(2).
246
247
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In Everfresh Market Virginia v. Shoprite Checkers, 250 the
Constitutional Court, in a non-binding obiter dictum, 251 indicated that the
infusion of the common law of contract with constitutional values
should incorporate “values of ubuntu, 252 which inspire much of [South
Africa’s] constitutional compact.” 253 “[Ubuntu] emphasises the
communal nature of society and ‘carries in it the ideas of humaneness,
social justice and fairness. . . .’” 254 In the new constitutional milieu,
under the influence of these principles, there has been some
movement in the direction of liberalising the veil piercing remedy. 255
B. Sources of South African Company Law
South African corporate law is heavily influenced by English
company law. Notably, “[t]he first Southern African Companies Act,
the Cape Joint Stock Companies Limited Liability Act of 1861 was
based on prior English companies legislation.” 256 Similarly, the first
South African Companies Act enacted after South Africa became the
Union of South Africa, the South African Companies Act 46 of 1926,
was also based on English statutory law. 257 As the South African
company law was largely based on English company law, the “inner
common law of companies,” being the courts’ decisions interpreting
sections of the Companies Act, was also based upon English law. 258
While English judicial decisions in connection with the English
Companies Act are not binding on South African courts, they are
250 Everfresh Market Virginia v. Shoprite Checkers 2012 (1) SA 256 (CC) at 276
para. 71 (S. Afr.).
251
An opinion expressed by a judge during the course of a judgment which
is not germane to a decision of the case. Such an opinion is persuasive but not
binding; R.D. Classen; Dictionary of Legal Words and Phrases: 2nd Ed (1997) Vol 3: p0-1.
252
A Zulu term.
253 Everfresh Market Virginia v. Shoprite Checkers 2012 (1) SA 256 (CC) at 276
para. 71.
254 Id. (quoting S v. Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at para. 237).
255 See Ex Parte Gore NO 2013 (3) SA 382 (WCC) at 395–97 paras. 27–29.
This case is analysed in more detail below.
256
4 W.A. JOUBERT & J.A. FARIS, THE LAW OF SOUTH AFRICA, pt. 1, para.
3, at 7 (W.A. Joubert & J.A. Faris eds., LexisNexis Durban 2d ed. 2013) (citing “23
of 1861” in footnote 1).
257 Id.
258 Id.
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afforded great respect. 259 However, when looking at English
precedents, differences in the respective legal systems and statutes
must be taken into account. 260
The Companies Act 61 of 1973 (“the Old Companies Act”)
followed the South African Companies Act 46 of 1926. It was based
fairly closely upon English law concepts. The Companies Act 71 of
2008 (“the New Companies Act”), while following the essential
English law construct, provided for significant changes in the Old
Companies Act which were primarily intended to promote flexibility
and accountability. 261
The South African law appertaining to corporate veil piercing
prior to the enactment of the 2008 Act follows closely on English
law. 262 Section 20(9) has for the first time introduced a statutory basis
for piercing the corporate veil. However, section 20(9) has not replaced
the common law on piercing the corporate veil. If anything, it creates
broad grounds for liability and is therefore supplemental to the
common law. 263 The introduction of a statutory basis for piercing the
corporate veil will probably, over time, have the effect of expanding
and liberalising the common law grounds for veil piercing. 264
C. The Early Cases
The seminal South African case that first grappled with the
issue of the corporate veil is Dadoo Limited v. Krugersdorp Municipal
Council. 265 The situation that arose in that case has similarities to
Daimler;an early apartheid statute prohibited land ownership by
“Asiatics” except in certain specific delineated areas. 266 The
Id.
See Joubert, supra note 257.
261
New Companies Act 71 of 2008 § 7 (S. Afr.).
262 See generally Cape Pacific Ltd. v. Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Ltd. 1995
(4) SA 790 (AD); Al-Kharafi & Sons v. Pema 2010 (2) SA 360 (W); Wambach v. Maizecor
Indus. (Edms) Bpk 1993 (2) SA 669 (A) at 675 D-E; Macadamia Finance Bpk v. De Wet
NO 1993 (2) SA 743(A) at 748 B-D; Ex Parte Gore NO 2013 (3) SA 382 (WCC).
263 Ex Parte Gore NO 2013 (3) SA 382 (WCC) at 399 para. 34.
264 Id.
265 See generally Dadoo Ltd. v. Krugersdorp Mun. Council 1920 AD 530.
266 Id. at 530.
259
260
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shareholders in the plaintiff were both “Asiatics” within the meaning
of the statute. 267 They incorporated a company with the object of
acquiring and trading in land. 268 The company purchased a property in
the city of Krugersdorp. 269 The Krugersdorp Municipal Council sought
to set aside the transfer of the land to the company on the basis that
the company’s acquisition of the land was “an evasion of the[] spirit
and intent” of the legislation—i.e., it was in fraudem legis. 270 The
Appellate Division rejected this argument. 271
In reaching its decision, South Africa’s second Chief Justice
Innes, enunciated the following principles: (i) citing to Salomon the
Court affirmed that a company is “a legal persona distinct from the
members who compose it[;]” 272 (ii) the company is not legally “the
agent of the subscribers or a trustee for them[;]” (iii) the position is not
changed where only one person controls all the shares in the company;
(iv) the distinction between the company and the its members is “no
merely artificial and technical thing” and is “a matter of substance[;]”
(v) property vested in the company is property of the company and the
company’s property cannot be regarded as vested in any of its
members. 273
The court then analysed whether the acquisition had taken
place in fraudem legis (i.e. in fraud of the law). It stated the basic principle
as follows:
[A] transaction is in fraudem legis when it is designedly
disguised so as to escape the provisions of the law, but
falls in truth within these provisions. Thus stated, the
rule is merely a branch of the fundamental doctrine
that the law regards the substance rather than the form
of things, —a doctrine common, one would think, to
Id. at 531.
Id.
269 Id.
270 Id. at 531, 540.
271 Id. at 550–53.
272 Id. at 550 (citing Salomon v. Salomon & Co. [1897] AC 22 (HL) at 51).
273 Dadoo Ltd. v. Krugersdorp Mun. Council 1920 AD 530, 550 (quoting Salomon
v. Salomon & Co. [1897] AC 22 (HL) at 51).
267
268
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every system of jurisprudence. . . . And if that be so,
then there is no practical difference between our rule
on this point and the rule of English law. 274
Having expressed the view (based upon the English decision
of Salomon that the company was an entity separate and distinct from
its member and that the South African doctrine of “simulation” was
similar to that enunciated in English law), the court had to deal with
the Daimler case. At first blush there was little to distinguish the facts
of Daimler from the facts of Dadoo other than that the legislation sought
to be enforced in Dadoo (the prohibition of land ownership by Asiatics)
was unjust and plainly unpalatable to the court. 275 However, the court
distinguished Daimler on the somewhat tenuous basis that “[a]
company cannot have an enemy character . . . [b]ut it can own land.” 276
The court also pointed out that Daimler was in any event difficult to
reconcile with Salomon, which had established that a company was a
separate and distinct legal personality. 277
The wheel came full circle on this issue in the newly democratic
South Africa in Manong & Associates (Pty) Ltd. v. City Manager, City of
Cape Town. 278 In that case, the court held that a juristic person can be
the victim of racial discrimination if its shareholders are historically
disadvantaged individuals. 279 The court distinguished Dadoo and
followed Daimler. 280

274 Dadoo Ltd. v. Krugersdorp Mun. Council 1920 AD 530 at 547. Cf.
Daimler Co. v. Cont’l Tyre & Rubber Co. [1916] 2 AC 307 at 315 (Eng.); Snook v.
London & West Riding Investments Ltd. [1967] 1 All ER 518 at 528; Yukong Line
Ltd. v. Rendsburg Investments Corp. [1998] 4 All ER 82 at 94; DeWitt Truck Brokers
Inc. v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co. 540 F.2d 681 (4th Cir. 1976).
275
Chief Justice Innes stated “No doubt these enactments were passed in
furtherance of a policy of social, political and economic inequality as between white
and coloured inhabitants of the Republic.” Dadoo Ltd. v. Krugersdorp Mun. Council 1920
AD 530, 549 (S. Afr.).
276 Id. at 552.
277 Id. at 551.
278 See generally Manong & Associates (Pty) Ltd. v. City Manager, City of Cape Town
2009 (1) SA 644 (EqC).
279 Id. at 655–56 paras. 34–35.
280 Id. at 655 paras. 32–33.
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Ironically, the Dadoo court refused to pierce the corporate veil
in part to protect the shareholders from racial discrimination, 281
whereas the Manong court pierced the corporate veil in order to protect
the shareholders from discrimination in an environment where striving
for racial equality has become the constitutional norm. 282
Once again, as in the cases of Daimler and Dadoo, the Manong
Court was influenced by politics and current public policy in the forum
in the manner in which it applied the law to the facts.
D. Towards a General Principle
As appears from what is more fully set forth below, the South
African courts have, prior to the enactment of the Companies Act 71
of 2008 (“the New Companies Act”), generally followed English law
principles in determining whether to pierce or lift the corporate veil.
However, more recent cases have attempted to establish a general
principle and at the same time affirm that the courts in postconstitutional South Africa should adopt a more liberal and less
hidebound approach to the subject. 283
To some extent, the need for further development of South
African law to allow for more veil piercing in order to render a
shareholder liable for a debt owed to a creditor of the company has
been inhibited by the presence of alternative remedies that make veil
piercing less necessary. In this respect, section 424 of the Companies
Act 61 of 1973 (“the Old Companies Act”), which is still applicable
after the enactment of the New Companies Act, 284 provides for
personal liability of any person “who was knowingly a party to the
carrying on of [a company’s] business” in way that was “reckless[] or
[done] with intent to defraud creditors of the company. . . .”
Section 64(1) of the Close Corporations Act 69 of 1984 (“the
Close Corporations Act”) (which applies to smaller closely held
Dadoo Limited v Krugersdorp Municipal Council 1920 AD 530, 549.
Manong at 654–56 paras. 31–35.
283 See Ebrahim v. Airport Cold Storage (Pty) Ltd. 2008 (6) SA 585 (SCA) at 594
para. 22; Ex Parte Gore NO 2013 (3) SA 382 (WCC) at 395–97 paras. 27–29.
284
New Companies Act 71 of 2008, Schedule 4 § 9.
281
282

160

The Mystery of the Corporate Veil

2019

7:1

corporations) provides personal liability where the business of the
close corporation was carried on “recklessly, with gross negligence or
with intent to defraud any person or for any fraudulent purpose. . . .”
This means that, where the court finds that there is reckless or
fraudulent conduct by the controlling shareholder, there is often no
need to pierce the corporate veil in order to render the shareholder
personally liable.
In Shipping Corporation of India Limited v. Evdomon Corporation, 285
the Appellate Division considered an application to attach a shipping
vessel that belonged to a company that was wholly owned by the
Government of India. 286 The applicant sought to attach the vessel to
found jurisdiction for a lawsuit against the Government of India. 287
The issue therefore arose whether the Government of India could be
treated as the owner of the vessel instead of the shipping company in
whose name the vessel was registered. 288 The court held that the mere
fact that the Government of India was the sole shareholder in the
corporation did not entitle the court to lift the corporate veil. 289
In approaching the subject, the court first cited to the basic
principle enunciated in Dadoothat “[a] registered company is a legal
persona distinct from the members who compose it.” 290 The court then
held:
It seems to me that generally it is of cardinal
importance to keep distinct the property rights of a
company and those of its shareholders, even where the
latter is a single entity, and that the only permissible
deviation from this rule known to our law occurs in
those (in practice) rare cases where the circumstances
justify ‘piercing’ or ‘lifting’ the corporate veil. And in
this regard it should not make any difference whether
285

(S. Afr.).

286
287
288
289
290

See generally Shipping Corp. of India Ltd. v. Evdomon Corp. 1994 (1) SA 550 (A)
Id at 550.
Id at 550.
Id at 551.
Id at 568–69.
Dadoo Ltd. v. Krugersdorp Mun. Council 1920 AD 530 at 550.
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the shares be held by a holding company or by a
Government. I do not find it necessary to consider, or
attempt to define, the circumstances on which the
Court will pierce the corporate veil. Suffice it to say
that they would generally have to include an element of
fraud or other improper conduct in the establishment
or use of the company or the conduct of its affairs. In
this connection, the words ‘device’, ‘strategem’, ‘cloak’
and ‘sham’ have been used. 291
In Cape Pacific Limited v. Lubner Controlling Investments, 292 the
South African Appellate Division was faced with a situation similar to
the one that had arisen in England in Jones v Lipman, 293 which the court
cited to in support of its judgment. 294 The plaintiff had bought shares
in a property owning company, from one Lubner. 295 Lubner
transferred the shares in the property owning company to another
company that he controlled in order to prevent the plaintiff from
asserting its rights under the agreement of sale. 296 The court pierced
the corporate veil and held that the transferee company could be
ordered to deliver the shares to the plaintiff just as if the shares had
remained vested in Lubner. 297
In arriving at its decision, the court enunciated the following
main principles in determining whether or not to pierce the corporate
veil: (i) the law will have regard to substance over form; 298 (ii) the court
291 Shipping Corp. of India Ltd. v. Evdomon Corp. 1994 (1) SA 550 (A) at 566 CF (citing Adams v. Cape Indus. PLC (1991) 1 All ER 929; Lategan v. Boyes 1980 (4) SA
191 (T) at 200 E-202 A (S. Afr.); Dithaba Platinum (Pty) Ltd. v. Erconovaal Ltd. 1985 (4)
SA 615 (T) at 624 B-625 J (S. Afr.)).
292 Cape Pacific Ltd. v. Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Ltd. 1995 (4) SA 790
(AD).
293
Jones v. Lipman (1962) 1 All ER 442 (Ch).
294
See Cape Pacific Ltd. v. Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Ltd. 1995 (4) SA
790 (AD) at 805 B-C, where the court also endorsed Gilford Motor Co. v. Horne
[1933] Ch 935 (CA).
295 Cape Pacific Ltd. v. Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Ltd. 1995 (4) SA 790
(AD) at 795–96.
296 Id.
297 Id. at 791–92.
298 Id. at 802 H-I.
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has no “general discretion simply to disregard” the separate personality
of the company merely because it thinks that it is “just to do so[;]” 299
(iii) the courts would pierce the corporate veil where “fraud, dishonesty
or other improper conduct” is found in the administration of the
corporation[;] 300 (iv) “[i]t is not necessary that a company should have
been conceived and founded in deceit. . . .” It is enough if it is currently
behaving fraudulently or improperly; 301 and (v) veil piercing is
available, even where another remedy exists. 302
Despite the fact that South African courts have defined the
requirements of piercing the corporate veil in broad discretionary
terms, the Cape Pacific court relied upon and endorsed a number of
English law decisions, including Salomon, Jones v. Lipman, Gilford Motors
and Cape Industries. 303 The close inter-relationship between English and
South African law has therefore been made very clear. 304
As noted above, the application of constitutional principles in
accordance with Section 35 of the Constitution has heralded in a more
liberal, flexible approach in developing the common law. This is
evident in some of the post-constitutional decisions on piercing the
corporate veil.
In Ebrahim v. Airport Cold Storage 305 the court held:
In contrast with the United Kingdom, where it seems
the equivalent provisions have in recent years ‘been
very rarely used’ to fasten directors with personal
liability, 306 the jurisprudence of this Court evidences
claimants’ spirited reliance on the provision. Though
courts will never ‘lightly disregard’ a corporation’s
299
300
301
302
303
304
305

para. 22.

Id. at 803 A.
Id. at 803 C-D.
Id. at 804 A-C.
Id. at 805 G.
Id. at 803–05.
Id.
Ebrahim v. Airport Cold Storage (Pty) Ltd. 2008 (6) SA 585 (SCA) at 594

306 Id. (citing Ad Valorem Factors Ltd. v. Ricketts [2004] 1 All ER 894 (CA)
at para. 2 (Eng.)).
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separate identity, nor likely find recklessness, such
conclusions when merited can only help in keeping
corporate governance true. 307
This is sound common sense.
In Ex Parte Gore NO the South African court (Binns-Ward, J)
conducted a thorough review of both English and South African law
in an attempt to define the general principles applicable to piercing the
corporate veil before the enactment of the New Companies Act. 308 The
court came to the following conclusions: (i) In the 1960s–1970s, South
African courts indicated a greater “willingness to ignore the separate
personality of individual companies in the group context. . . .” 309 (ii)
however, in recent years, the courts have followed the more current
conservative trend of the English courts evidenced in Adams v. Cape
Industries[;] 310 (iii) recent cases have also indicated that “the separate
personality of juristic persons should only be disregarded in
exceptional circumstances and as a last resort[;]” 311 (iv) careful analysis
of the South African authorities does show that the courts will,
however, go behind the veil where that is “just and equitable” and that
remedy is not limited to places where “there is no alternative
remedy[;]” 312 (v) fraud is not an essential element for piercing the
corporate veil. 313
Having summarised these general principles, Binns-Ward J
summed up the approach of the South African courts as follows:

307

para. 22.

Ebrahim v. Airport Cold Storage (Pty) Ltd. 2008 (6) SA 585 (SCA) at 594

Ex Parte Gore NO 2013 (3) SA 382 (WCC) at 395–97 paras. 27–29.
Id. at 395 para. 27.
310 Id. (citing Adams v. Cape Industries [1991] 1 All ER 929 (Ch.D));
Wambach v. Maizecor Indus. (Edms) Bpk [1993] (2) SA 669 (A) at 675 D-E (S. Afr.);
Macadamia Finance Bpk v. De Wet 1993 (2) SA 745 (A) at 748 B-D (S. Afr.).
311 Ex Parte Gore NO 2013 (3) SA 382 (WCC) at 395 para. 27 (citing HülseReutter v. Gödde 2001 (4) SA 1336 (SCA) at para. 23; Al-Kharafi & Sons v. Pema 2010
(2) SA 360 (W) at 387 para. 37.)
312 Ex Parte Gore NO 2013 (3) SA 382 (WCC) at 396 para. 28.
313 Id. at 396 para. 28.
308
309
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In my view the determination to disregard the
distinctness provided in terms of a company’s separate
legal personality appears in each case to reflect a policy
based decision resultant upon a weighing by the court
of the importance of giving effect to the legal concept
of juristic personality, acknowledging the material
practical and legal considerations that underpin the
legal fiction, on the other hand, as against the adverse
moral and economic effects of countenancing an
unconscionable abuse of the concept by the founders,
shareholders, or controllers of a company, on the
other. 314
The balancing act proposed by Binns-Ward J in the latter
paragraph pragmatically recognises the difficulties in trying to reconcile
the various judgments on this issue. It is a frank assessment of how the
courts really seem to arrive at what is in essence a policy-based decision
in most cases—they weigh the need to protect the separate juristic
personality of the company against other values that have to be
recognised in the public interest.
The court’s judgment in Ex Parte Gore also contains a
perspicacious and pithy analysis of the English authorities on the
subject. 315 Apart from its utility as a summary, it demonstrates how
closely tied South African law on the subject is to the English law.
However, the heavy reliance on English law by the South African
courts obscures the more liberal nature of veil piercing and the alter
ego doctrine in post-constitutional South Africa. The advent of the
Constitution and its requirement that the common law be developed
in order to conform to the values of the Constitution has inevitably
heralded a more liberal and equity oriented approach to the law. In the
context of piercing the corporate veil, it should ameliorate the severity
of the English law with respect to corporate veil piercing and infuse
the courts with the desire to do equity where that is possible without

314
315

Id. at 397 para. 29.
Id. at 390–394 paras. 19–26.
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doing violence to necessary legal and commercial principles like the
concept of separate juristic personality.
E. Piercing the Corporate Veil under the New Companies Act
Section 20(9) of the New Companies Act has introduced a
statutory basis for piercing or lifting the corporate veil. It provides:
If, on the application of an interested person or in any
proceedings in which a company is involved, a court
finds that the incorporation of the company, or any use
of the company, or any act by or on behalf of the
company, constitutes an unconscionable abuse of the
juristic personality of the company as a separate entity,
the court may:
(a)
declare that the company is to be deemed not
to be a juristic person in respect of any right, obligation
or liability of a company or of a shareholder of the
company or, in the case of a non-profit company, a
member of the company, or of another person
specified in the declaration; and
(b)
make any further order of the court the court
considers appropriate to give effect to a declaration
contemplated in paragraph (a).
In Ex Parte Gore, Binns-Ward J enunciated the following
principles with regard to section 20(9) of the New Companies Act: (i)
prior to the enactment of the statute, piercing or setting aside the veil
was governed by common law. The introduction of a statutory
provision was likely to “erode the . . . philosophy” that piercing the
corporate veil should only take place in exceptional circumstances. “By
expressly establishing its availability simply when the facts of a case
justify it,” the legislature indicated that the remedy should not be
regarded as “exceptional, or ‘drastic[;]’” 316 (ii) the use of the term
Id. at 399 para. 34 (citing Amlin (SA) (Pty) Ltd. v. Van Kooij 2008 (2) SA
558 (C) at para. 23 (S. Afr.); Knoop N.O. and Others v Birkenstock Properties (Pty) Ltd. and
Others [2009] ZAFSHC 67, at para. 23).
316
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“unconscionable abuse” in the statute instead of “gross abuse” also extends
the availability of the remedy because the former term implies a less
stringent test than the latter; 317 (iii) “[t]he term ‘unconscionable abuse
of the juristic personality’ encompasses common law terms such as
‘sham’, ‘device’, ‘stratagem[,]’” previously used in connection with veil
piercing cases but also goes further. The remedy is available “whenever
the illegitimate use of the concept of juristic personality adversely
affects a third party in a way that reasonably should not be
countenanced[;]” 318 (iv) the statute is “supplemental” to the common
law and does not substitute it; 319 and (v) the remedy is available even
when there may be an alternative remedy. 320
In short, the effect of the enactment of Section 20(9) of the
New Companies Act is to considerably enlarge the scope of the
common law veil piercing remedy in South African law. The test
enunciated by Binns-Ward J is considerably more fluid than the
principles set out in prior decisions. It remains to be seen whether
South African appeal courts will be able to overcome their inherent
conservatism on this issue and significantly broaden the scope of the
remedy.
F. Groups of Companies and the Agency Principles in South Africa
The group/agency principle first reared its head in South
Africa in Adcock-Ingram Laboratories Limited v. Lennon Limited, the issue
in that case was whether the use of a trademark by a subsidiary
company of the proprietor of the trademark constituted a “permitted
use” by the proprietor/holding company. 321 The court, led by
Nicholas J, held that there was no evidence that the subsidiary
company was using the trademark as the agent of the holding
company. 322 The mere fact that the subsidiary was subject to the
control of the holding company did not mean that there was a
317 Ex Parte Gore NO 2013 (3) SA 382 (WCC) at 399 para. 34 (referring to
the term used in Section 20(9) of the New Companies Act).
318 Id.
319 Id.
320 Id.
321 Adcock-Ingram Laboratories Ltd. v. Lennon Ltd. 1983 (2) SA 350 (T).
322 Id. at 351 H, 352 A-C, 353 A-B.
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relationship of agent and principal between them. There was no
contract of agency, either express or implied. 323
The matter arose again some five years later before the same
judge (who was now sitting in the Appellate Court) in Ritz Hotel Limited
v. Charles of the Ritz Limited. 324 The issue was a similar one—whether
the use of a trademark by a holding company of the respondent,
Charles of the Ritz, amounted to a “permitted use” within the meaning
of the relevant trademark law. Nicholas AJA questioned whether he
had correctly decided the issue in Adcock Ingram. 325 However, the facts
of the Ritz Hotel case were slightly different in that the court held that,
in exercising quality control over the goods manufactured, the holding
company acted as the agent of the subsidiary. 326 There was, therefore,
a “permitted use” by the South African subsidiary. 327
Although the facts were slightly different, the approach of the
court was also substantively different. Citing to DHN Food 328 the court
noted a more liberal approach by the English courts to treat
subsidiaries in the group as a single economic entity. 329 The South
African court cited with apparent approval to a statement of Lord
Denning in DHN Food that “[t]here is evidence of a general tendency
to ignore the separate legal entities of various companies within a
group, and to look instead at the economic entity of the whole
group.” 330

Id. at 353 A-B.
Ritz Hotel Ltd. v. Charles of the Ritz Ltd. 1988 (3) SA 290 (A).
325 Id. at 316 A-B.
326 Id. at 317 A-D.
327 Id.
328
DHN Food Distributors Ltd. v. London Borough of Tower Hamlets
[1976] 3 All ER 462 (CA) at 467 B-C.
329 Ritz Hotel Ltd. v. Charles of the Ritz Ltd. 1988 (3) SA 290 (A) at314 H–317
D. As noted above, this principle was subsequently debunked in Adams v. Cape
Indus. PLC (1991) 1 All ER 929 at 1016 (Eng.).
330 Ritz Hotel Ltd. v. Charles of the Ritz Ltd. 1988 (3) SA 290 (A) at 315 F-H
(quoting DHN Food Distributors Ltd. v. London Borough of Tower Hamlets [1976]
3 All ER 462 (CA) at 467 B-C.
323
324
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The court also cited with approval to the judgment of Dillon J
in Revlon, Inc. v. Cripps & Lee Limited, 331 which held that a narrow
emphasis on the individuality of companies in a group “is not in
accordance with recent authorities.” 332
Once again, it is necessary to emphasise that the courts in Ritz
Hotel, DHN Food and Revlon were willing to be bold about enunciating
a “single economic entity theory” when this was to the advantage of
the companies in the group and did not have the effect of unfairly
disadvantaging any third parties. The application of the doctrine in so
limited a fashion carries with it the seeds of its own destruction. Why
should the holding company in a group have the benefit of insulating
itself from the liabilities of its subsidiary while at the same time
claiming that the members of the group should be treated as one where
that is to the benefit of the holding company? While it may be
appropriate to pierce the corporate veil of companies in a single
economic unit where this is to the benefit of a third party, it is unfair
to allow a reverse veil piercing for the benefit of the entity that chose
to set up such a convoluted corporate structure in the first place.
The Ritz Hotel case was decided before Cape Industries finally
discredited the “single economic entity theory” in England. 333 After
Cape Industries was decided, the issue of whether companies in a group
could be treated as a single economic entity came before the South
African court again in Wambach v. Maizecor Industries (Edms) Bpk. 334 This
was a tort claim. The Appellate Division refused to pierce the
corporate veil to hold that damage done by a mechanical horse and
trailer registered in the name of a wholly owned subsidiary (which
shared the same directors with the holding company) should be treated
as a tort committed by the holding company. 335 The court noted that
piercing the corporate veil to treat all companies in the group as one
331 Ritz Hotel Ltd. v. Charles of the Ritz Ltd. 1988 (3) SA 290 (A) at 315 H-J
(citing Revlon Inc. v. Cripps & Lee Ltd. 1980 FSR 85 (Ch) at 95 (Eng.)).
332 Ritz Hotel Ltd. v. Charles of the Ritz Ltd. 1988 (3) SA 290 (A) at 315 H-J
(quoting Revlon Inc. v. Cripps & Lee Ltd. 1980 FSR 85 (Ch) at 95 (Eng.)).
333
Adams v. Cape Indus. PLC (1991) 1 All ER 929 at 1016 (Eng.).
334 See generally Wambach v. Maizecor Industries (Edms) Bpk 1993 (2) SA 669
(AD).
335 Id. at 671, 675 B-D.
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would lead to “total darkness.” 336 Nobody would know what the status
of a trademark was or who had property rights in things like the
mechanical trailer at issue. 337
In Macadamia Finance Bpk v. De Wet, the court also endorsed
Cape Industries and concluded that the liquidators (trustees) of a holding
company in liquidation had no duty to insure the assets of the
subsidiary company. 338
In Al-Kharafi & Sons v. Pema, 339 the issue arose again in a fairly
unusual context: the Master of the High Court 340 set aside an
assignment 341 from a company called MAK to a related entity, the
applicant, Al-Kharafi. 342 The assignment had been effected so that AlKharafi would be able to set-off a debt that it owed to the insolvent
company against a debt owed by the insolvent company to MAK. 343
Al-Kharafi argued, based upon cases like DHN Food, that the
court should ignore the assignment from MAK to Kharafi because
they were members of a single economic entity and that, as a result,
there had been no assignment in substance. 344 The applicant contended
for a “reverse piercing of the veil” — i.e., the applicant was voluntarily
asking the court to pierce the corporate veil to assist it rather than to
saddle it with liability. 345
The court delivered a carefully reasoned judgment analysing
(and ultimately following) the post-Cape Industries English law on this
Id. at 675 B-D.
Id.
338 Id. at 744, 748 A-F.
339 Al-Kharafi & Sons v. Pema 2010 (2) SA 360 (W) (S. Afr.).
340
An official charged with the overall administration of an insolvent
company in South Africa. See Insolvency Act 24 of 1936, § 1.
341
Called a “cession” in South Africa. See 2 WA Joubert & JA Faris Law of
South Africa: Part 2: para 1 (W.A. Joubert & J.A. Faris eds. LexisNexis Durban: 2nd
Ed: 2003).
342 Al-Kharafi & Sons v Pema 2010 (2) SA 360 (W) at 360–61.
343 Id.
344 Id. at 368 para. 9.
345 Id. at 380 para. 30 (citing “Joubert (ed) The Law of South Africa (first
reissue) vol 4(1) para 42”)
336
337
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subject. 346 Based upon the more conservative trends in English law as
embodied in Woolfson v. Strathclyde Regional Council and Adams v. Cape
Industries, the court held that the “single economic entity” theory did
not apply in South Africa. 347
The court rejected the concept that the corporate veil ought to
be pierced “where the interests of justice require it.” 348 Ultimately, the
court held that this was, in any event, an inappropriate situation in
which to pierce the corporate veil. 349
The court also rejected the applicant’s defence because Kharafi
was not a shareholder, directly or indirectly, in MAK. 350 Although they
had common shareholders, they were entirely separate entities. The
court held that it was “trite that when a court pierces the corporate veil
it treats the assets and liabilities of the company as assets and liabilities
of the shareholder.” 351
Accordingly, for better or for worse the South African courts
have rejected the “single economic entity theory.” A holding company
cannot be held liable for the debts of its subsidiary simply because they
are companies within a group.
IV. PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL IN THE U.S.
At first blush, English and American law on this subject may
appear to be different, but there are significant similarities. Both
jurisdictions have attempted to lay down general principles while at the
same time seeking to preserve a significant amount of discretion for
the courts to respond to the rich ingenuity of human dishonesty. The
judicial opinions of both jurisdictions tend to emphasise that a
corporation is an entity separate and distinct from its members before
Id. at 382–88 paras. 33–39.
Id. at 384–88 paras. 35–39.
348
It was the applicant in this case who asserted this argument, which the
court quoted. Id. at 383, 386 paras. 34, 36. Cf. Ben Hashem v. Al Shayif [2009] 1 FLR
115 at 154–55 paras. 160–61.
349 Id. at 387–88 para. 39.
350 Id.
351 Id. at 387 para. 38.
346
347
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explaining why the court should or should not pierce the corporate veil
in the particular instance before it. 352
It is apparent from the English and South African cases
analysed above that legal systems that adhere more closely to English
Company Law have been reluctant to pierce the corporate veil to hold
a shareholder liable for the debts of the company. They have been less
reluctant to lift the veil and treat a shareholder and its subsidiary as one
to prevent a dishonest shareholder from utilising a corporation as a
sham to skim assets or to conduct activities in violation of a legal
obligation. In contrast, American courts have more frequently
(although not necessarily easily) permitted the veil to be pierced to hold
a shareholder liable for the debts of his company and there are many
examples of this in federal law and in the jurisprudence of the fifty
states. 353
It is beyond the scope of this article to attempt a comparative
approach to veil piercing in every legal jurisdiction of the United States.
I have, therefore, chosen to focus on a small number of federal and
state cases which set out the general principles that seem to be followed
in most U.S. jurisdictions.
An empirical study undertaken by Professor Robert B.
Thompson 354 notes that “[p]iercing the corporate veil is the most
litigated issue in [American] corporate law. . . .” 355 Although there are
no similar statistical studies in England and South Africa, a careful
search of the legal reports in both jurisdictions will produce only a
limited number of veil piercing cases and even fewer successful ones.
In contrast, Thompson found that in the 1,583 reported U.S. cases on
piercing the corporate veil, 40% of the cases resulted in a veil piercing
in which the court held the shareholder liable for the debts of its
352 See generally Pacific Canning Co. v. Hewes 95 F.2d 42, 45 (9th Cir. 1938);
DeWitt Truck Brokers Inc. v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co. 540 F.2d 681 (4th Cir. 1976);
United States v. Bestfoods 524 U.S. 51, 61 (1998); Salomon v. Salomon & Co. [1897] AC
22 (HL) (Eng.); Dadoo Ltd. v. Krugersdorp Mun. Council 1920 AD 530 (S. Afr.); Cape
Pacific Ltd. v Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Ltd. 1995 (4) SA 790 (AD) at 807.
353 See GEVURTZ, supra note 147, at 60–111.
354
See THOMPSON, supra note 5.
355 Id. at 1036.
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company. 356 Interestingly, Delaware, the state in which most major
U.S. companies are incorporated, has produced no reported successful
veil piercing cases. 357
Thompson notes that there are no instances in which the
corporate veil has been pierced to impose liability on public
shareholders and that the larger the number of shareholders in a
company, the lower the statistical likelihood of corporate veil
piercing. 358 There is nothing in the stated legal principles of most U.S.
jurisdictions that would account for the significantly greater incidence
of veil piercing in the US as compared to England and South Africa.
The real explanation may be this. The decision to pierce the corporate
veil is a balancing act and the way in which courts resolve it has more
to do with the public morals and commercial realities of the
jurisdiction in which the veil piercing claim is made.
A. The Template Approach
A common approach of U.S. courts is to utilise a list of
potential grounds for piercing the corporate veil, and when some or all
of them are present with a sufficiently egregious array of facts, the
corporate veil is pierced. Gevurtz calls this the “template approach.” 359
In DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc. v. W Ray Flemming Fruit Company 360
the Fourth Circuit enunciated the following principles with regard to
the factors that justify corporate veil piercing: (i) the court recognised
that the circumstances in which a court would pierce the corporate veil
have been “rarely articulated with any clarity[.]” The court noted that
this was perhaps the case because every case was sui generis depending

THOMPSON, supra note 5, at 1048.
Id. at 1051–53. Thompson attributes this to the fact that “Delaware’s
traditional focus has been on large corporations” with multiple shareholders, with
publicly traded securities in many instances. Id. But perhaps it also speaks to a more
conservative public morality that recognises how important limited liability is to the
state’s economy.
358 Id. at 1054–55.
359
GEVURTZ, supra note 147, at 71.
360 DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc. v. W Ray Flemming Fruit Co. 540 F.2d 681 (4th
Cir. 1976).
356
357
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upon its underlying facts; 361 (ii) proof of “plain fraud” is not a necessary
element in a finding to disregard the corporate veil; 362 (iii) where
substantial ownership of all of the stock is in the hands of a single
individual and there has been a disregard of “the corporate fiction[,]”
the courts had little difficulty in applying the “alter ego” or
“instrumentality” theory in order to set aside the corporate veil and
“fasten liability on the individual stockholder[;]” 363 (iv) regarding the
application of both the instrumentality and the alter ego doctrine, the
courts “are concerned with reality and not form. . . .” 364 (v) where a
one man or closely held corporation is “grossly undercapitalized for
the purposes of the corporate undertaking” that will usually justify
piercing the corporate veil. 365 Other factors that can be taken into
account are a “failure to observe corporate formalities, non-payment
of dividends, the insolvency of the debtor corporation 366 . . . syphoning
of funds of the corporation by the dominant stockholder, nonfunctioning of other officers or directors, absence of corporate
records, and the fact that the corporation is merely a fa[ç]ade for the
operations of the dominant stockholder or stockholders[;]” 367 (vi) the
decision to disregard the corporate veil cannot rest on a single factor.
It must involve a number of factors and there must also be present an
“element of injustice or fundamental unfairness.” 368

Id. at 684 (quoting Swanson v. Levy, 509 F.2d 859, 861–62 (9th Cir. 1975)).
Cf. the South African case of Cape Pacific Ltd. v. Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Ltd.
1995 (4) SA 790 (AD) at 805 B-C (commenting on the difficulties in stating a general
rule because circumstances could be so varied); the English case of Adams v. Cape
Indus. PLC (1991) 1 All ER 929 at 1025.
362 DeWitt Truck Brokers, 540 F.2d at 684–85.
363 Id. at 685.
364 Id.. Cf. Cape Pacific Ltd. v. Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Ltd. 1995 (4)
SA 790 (AD) at 803 (holding that veil piercing was justified in cases of fraud or
“improper conduct”).
365 DeWitt Truck Brokers, 540 F.2d at 685.
366
This really overlaps with undercapitalisation.
367 Id. at 686–87. The term “façade” is a really a conclusion rather than a fact.
In my opinion, it should not be utilised so frequently that it obscures the need to
find the necessary factors present for piercing the veil.
368 Id. at 687. See United States v. Pisani 646 F.2d 83, 88 (1981) (the court
followed the DeWitt template and held that it set out a federal standard for corporate
veil piercing). See generally United States v. Golden Acres, Inc., 702 F. Supp. 1097 (D.Del.
1988) (the court followed DeWitt and Pisani); Harco Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Green Farms, Inc.,
361
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In comparison, English and South African courts both hold
that the corporate veil cannot be pierced merely because it is “in the
interests of justice” to do so. 369 However, the De Witt approach
requires “an element of injustice or fundamental unfairness” in
addition to the presence of more than one of the factors listed in the
template. 370 As more is required than mere injustice, American, English
and South African law are not fundamentally different on this issue. It
is also interesting to note how similar the template list of factors is to
the list of factors that the English court considered in Cape Industries in
deciding whether the U.S. company, NAAC, was simply an agent of
Cape. 371
In Harper v. Delaware Valley Broadcasters, Inc. 372 the United States
District Court interpreted Delaware state law as follows:
Both courts 373 noted that “no single factor could justify
a decision to disregard the corporate entity, but . . .
some combination of them was required, and that an
overall element of injustice or unfairness must always
be present, as well.” Simply phrased, the standard may
be restated as: “whether [the two entities] operate as a
single economic entity such that it would inequitable
for this Court to uphold a legal distinction between
them.” 374

Del. Ch. C.A. No.1131; Lakota Girl Scout Council, Inc. v. Havey Fund-Raisings Mgmt., 519
F.2d 634 (8th Cir. 1975); GEVURTZ, supra note 147, at 71 (listing the template factors).
369
Ben Hashem v. Al Shayif [2009] 1 FLR 115 at 154 para. 160 (Eng.); Ex
Parte Gore No 2013 (3) SA 382 (WCC) at 396 para. 28 (S. Afr.).
370 DeWitt Truck Brokers, 540 F.2d at 687.
371
Adams v. Cape Indus. PLC (1991) 1 All ER 929 at 1027.
372 Harper v. Del. Valley Broadcasters, Inc., 743 F. Supp. 1076 (D.Del. 1990).
373 Id. at 1085 ((citing Harco Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Green Farms, Inc., Del.Ch., C.A.
No. 1131, Hartnett, V.C., slip op. at 10, 1989 WL 110537 (Sept. 19, 1989)).
374 Harper, 743 F. Supp. at 1085 (quoting Mabon, Nugent & Co. v. Texas
American Energy Corp., Del.Ch., C.A. No. 8576, Berger, V.C., mem. op. at 12, 1990
WL 44267 (Apr. 12, 1990));. Cf. Smith, Stone & Knight Ltd. v. Lord Mayor [1939] 4
All ER 116 at 120–121; DHN Food Distributors Ltd. v. London Borough of Tower
Hamlet [1976] 3 All ER 462 at 467 467; rejected by the English court in Woolfson
v. Strathclyde Reg’l Council 1978 SLT 159 at 161.
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Harper was not endorsing piercing the corporate veil simply
when two entities were “a single economic entity.” It is clear from the
quotation above that it is only where the entities constitute a single
economic entity and there are sufficient template factors present that
piercing the corporate veil will be warranted. 375
In some ways, the template approach of U.S. jurisprudence is
a little more definitive, and therefore it should, by its very nature, be
more limiting than the English and South African tests. By creating a
list of factors and requiring that more than one of them be present
together with an “overall element of injustice or unfairness” the court
impliedly excludes veil piercing where only one of those factors is
possible or where there is no “overall element of injustice or
unfairness.” 376
Gevurtz 377 comments with some exasperation on the confusing
and somewhat inconsistent manner in which U.S. courts have applied
the template approach. The author makes the point that it is not clear
what weight each factor should be given in conducting an evaluation. 378
He notes that some factors that the courts consider (such as nonpayment of dividends or a mere failure to observe corporate
formalities) may be neutral in their effect upon the creditor who seeks
to pierce the veil. 379
Perhaps Gevurtz is overestimating the problem; the case law is
very clear that one factor alone will not suffice. While it might not be
clear exactly how much weight to give each factor, the template has
significant advantages in that it affords greater guidance to the courts
than the more vague and general approach of the English and South
African courts while at the same time retaining flexibility. Although I
have differentiated between the template approach and the
instrumentality theory, application of the one does not exclude the

375
376
377
378
379

See Harper, 743 F. Supp. at 1085.
See id.
GEVURTZ, supra note 147, at 60–61.
Id. at 71.
Id. at 71–72.
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other. The courts can combine the two factors in their analysis, as
happened in De Witt. 380
Thompson’s empirical analysis demonstrates that, where certain
factors are mentioned they may carry greater weight in the court’s
decision to pierce the corporate veil. 381 For example, where
“instrumentality” was mentioned, it resulted in veil piercing in 97.33%
of cases; when under-capitalisation was mentioned, it resulted in veil
piercing in 73% of cases; where an overlap in business activities
between corporations was noted, it resulted in veil piercing 81% of the
time. 382
In summary, the “template” approach considers a variety of
factors, more than one of which must be present for the court to
disregard the corporate form. In addition, there must be “an overall
element of injustice or unfairness.” 383 As each case must be treated on
its own facts, the courts have avoided being too didactic in what weight
should be given to each factor.
B. Agency, Instrumentality and Alter Ego
A number of U.S. cases approach the question of whether a
corporation should be liable for the debts of its subsidiary on an
agency, “instrumentality” or alter ego principle. The manner in which
American courts have applied this principle to subsidiaries is not
significantly different from the approach of the English court in Adams
v Cape Industries.
One of the earlier American cases that enunciated the
agency/instrumentality principle was Pacific Can Co. v. Hewes. 384 The
Ninth Circuit enunciated the following principles: (i) a corporation “is
an entity, distinct in itself[;]” (ii) however, where “resourcefulness of
380 See generally DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc. v. W. Ray Flemming 540 F.2d 681,
685–687 (4th Cir. 1976).
381 See THOMPSON, supra note 5, at 1063–64.
382 Id.
383 Harper v. Del. Valley Broadcasters, Inc., 743 F. Supp. 1076, 1085 (D.Del.
1990). See generally DeWitt Truck Brothers, Inc. v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co. 540 F.2d 681
(4th Cir. 1976).
384 Pacific Can Co. v. Hewes 95 F.2d 42 (9th Cir. 1938).
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man caused a corporation to be used as a scapegoat for another[,]” the
Courts “checked the evil” by piercing the corporate veil; (iii) the
corporate veil will be disregarded where the corporation is “so
organized and controlled” that it simply constitutes “an instrumentality
or adjunct of another corporation[;]” (iv) dominion over the subsidiary
“may be so complete” and “interference so obtrusive” that by ordinary
laws of agency the parent, as principal, will be liable for the actions of
its agent, the corporation; (v) where control is even worse than this,
veil piecing can be based upon “honesty and justice.” 385
Accordingly, liability can be based on the application of
conventional agency principles as well as upon an instrumentality
principle that seeks to unravel a fraud. If the corporation is in fact the
agent of the shareholder, liability can be imposed without proof of
fraud.
In Lowendahl v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, 386 the court
enunciated the instrumentality test as follows:
The ‘instrumentality’ rule may be formulated as
follows: Where a parent corporation at the time of the
transaction complained of (1) exercises control over its
subsidiary not in a manner not normal and usual with
stockholders, but to such extent and in such manner,
in disregard of the subsidiary’s corporate
paraphernalia, directors, and officers, that the
subsidiary has become a mere instrumentality or
department of the parent’s own business and the
parent, under the unreal form of the subsidiary, is the
real actor in the transaction; or where the business and
officers of the two corporations have become so
inextricably confused that it is impossible or
impracticable to identify the corporation that
participated in the transaction attacked; and (2) where
such control has been used by the parent to commit
fraud, or violate other legal duty, or has been used to
Id. at 45–46. This is similar to the Anglo-South African approach.
Lowendahl v. Balt. & Ohio R.R., 247 A.D 144 (N.Y. App. Div. 1936), aff’d,
6 N.E.2d 56 (N.Y. 1936).
385
386
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do an act tainted by dishonesty or unjust conduct
violating plaintiff’s rights (or under circumstances
giving rise to an estoppel); and (except in estoppel
cases) (3) where such fraud or wrong results in unjust
loss or injury to plaintiff, the court, in disregard of the
corporate entity of the subsidiary, will hold the parent
liable. Even without the preceding restrictions and
limitations, the parent corporation will be liable where
the parent has expressly made a subsidiary its agent or
has itself committed the tort in suit, 387 as, for example,
in the railroad system cases relating to personal injuries
where the employees committing the tort were held to
be the immediate employees of the parent as well as of
the subsidiary. 388
Accordingly, the holding company can be held liable not only
under the instrumentality theory (which is a fairly onerous test as laid
out in the judgment), but also on the basis that the parent corporation
has expressly made its subsidiary an agent. Insofar as a U.S. court may
employ a pure agency theory, the analysis would be closer to that of
the English courts in cases like Smith Stone & Knight. The three-pronged
test enunciated in Lowendahl is theoretically more onerous than the test
adopted by English and South African courts for determining whether
the subsidiary is merely an agent for the shareholder because it requires
proof of dishonesty, violation of a legal duty, or other unjust conduct,
and that that behaviour proximately caused injury to the plaintiff. 389
In Hamilton v. Water Whole Intern. Corp., 390 the court considered
whether one of the defendants was the “alter ego” of a corporation.
Citing to Wallace v. Tulsa Yellowcab Taxi Baggage Co., the court held that
This may explain why the courts will pierce the corporate veil less often
in tort cases than in contract matters. If the shareholder is a party to the tort, then
the shareholder can be liable on ordinary principles of tort law. If the shareholder is
not a party to the tort, there is no reason to pierce the corporate veil. See United States
v. Bestfoods 524 U.S. 51, at 61 (1998).
388 Lowendahl v. Balt. & Ohio R.R., 247 A.D 144, 156–57 (N.Y. App. Div.
1936).
389 See id.
390 Hamilton v. Water Whole Intern. Corp. 302 Fed. App’x 789, 793–94 (10th
Cir. 2008).
387

179

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

2019

7:1

under circumstances where “‘the corporation is so organized and
controlled and its affairs so conducted that it is merely an
instrumentality or adjunct of another corporation’ the two
corporations will no longer be considered distinct legal entities.” 391 In
short, the court appeared to consider that the alter ego theory was just
another term for instrumentality.
The court held that the following factors should be taken into
account in making the determination:
(1) whether the dominant corporation owns or
subscribes to all the subservient corporations stock, (2)
whether the dominant and subservient corporations
have common directors and officers, (3) whether the
dominant corporation provides financing to the
subservient corporation, (4) whether the subservient
corporation is grossly undercapitalised, (5) whether the
dominant corporation pays the salaries, expenses or
losses of the subservient corporation, (6) whether most
of the subservient corporation’s business is with the
dominant corporation or the subservient corporation’s
assets were conveyed from the dominant corporation,
(7) whether the dominant corporation refers to the
subservient corporation as a division or department,
(8) whether the subservient corporation’s officers or
directors follow the dominant corporation’s directions,
and (9) whether the corporations observed the legal
formalities for keeping the entities separate. 392
These cases reveal that there is significant overlap between the
template approach and the instrumentality or alter ego doctrines.
However, the template approach is concerned more specifically with
misconduct in the administration of the corporation while the
Id. (quoting Wallace v. Tulsa Yellowcab Taxi Baggage Co., 178 Okla. 15, 61
P.2d 645, 648 (1936)).
392 Hamilton v. Water Whole Intern. Corp. 302 Fed. App’x 789, 793 (10th Cir.
2008) (quoting Gilbert v. Sec. Fin. Corp., 152 P.3d 165, 175 (Okla. 2006). Compare this
with the approach of the English court in Smith, Stone & Knight Ltd. v. Lord Mayor
[1939] 4 All ER 117 at 121.
391
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instrumentality approach is more focused on the issue of dominance
by one person or entity over another. The indicia utilised in Hamilton
seeks to resolve the control issue. 393
In Japan Petroleum Company (Nigeria) Limited v. Ashland Oil, 394 the
court considered the agency or instrumentality theory in the context of
an international corporate group. The plaintiff sought to hold the
defendant, a Kentucky corporation, liable for the debts of two of its
wholly owned subsidiaries engaged in oil exploration in Nigeria. In
language that looks very similar (but is more succinct) than that of the
English court in Adams v. Cape Industries, the court refused to pierce the
corporate veil. 395 It held that the Nigerian subsidiaries were not under
the “complete domination or control” of the American holding
company. 396 The Nigerian companies were in every sense operating
companies. Under Nigerian law, the subsidiaries could not have
engaged in petroleum exploration and production activity unless they
were Nigerian corporations conducting their own operations. 397
The court enunciated the following principles: (i) it is not
necessary to prove fraud or inequity in order to demonstrate that there
is an agency relationship between a parent and subsidiary; 398 (ii) the
central factual issue in determining whether an agency relationship
exists is the issue of control—“whether the parent corporation
dominates the activities of the subsidiary[;]” 399 (iii) the fact that one
corporation controls the majority of voting shares in another; that the
two companies have common officers and directors, and that the
parent corporation finances the operations of the subsidiaries do not
necessarily support a finding that the subsidiary is “a mere agent or
instrumentality for the parent[;]” 400 (iv) in order to decide whether an
agency relationship exists, the court looks to a “wide variety of
393

Cir. 2008).
394
395
396
397
398
399
400

See Hamilton v. Water Whole Intern. Corp. 302 Fed. App’x 789, 793–94 (10th
Japan Petroleum Co. v. Ashland Oil, Inc. 456 F. Supp. 831, 834 (D.Del. 1978).
Id. at 845–46.
Id. at 845.
Id. at 844–45.
See id. at 840;
Id. at 841.
Id.
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factors,” such as stock ownership, common officers and directors,
financing, “responsibility for day-to-day operations, arrangements for
payment of salaries and expenses and, [the] origin of [the] subsidiary’s
business and assets[;]” 401 (v) an important factor in determining
whether the Nigerian company was not an agent of the US company
was that the Nigerian company was an operating company and not
merely a a shell corporation, which was responsible for mining
exploration and efforts of production, employees’ conduct and “many
of the day-to-day operations in connection with these activities[;]” 402
(vi) “[a]rrangements by a parent and subsidiary for economy of
expense and convenience of administration” did not necessarily
establish an agency relationship. 403
A further factor in the court’s reasoning appears to have been
that American corporations should be free to establish foreign
subsidiaries with “common management programs which promote
administrative convenience without destroying the immunity of the
parent from liability for the obligations of its foreign
subsidiaries. . . .” 404 This suggests that, as in Adams v. Cape Industries, the
U.S. court was concerned with protecting local companies from
liability for the debts of foreign subsidiaries.
In Craig v. Lake Asbestos of Quebec Limited, the court considered
the liability of Charter Consolidated PLC under New Jersey law for the
tort obligations of the very same Cape Industries that was the
defendant in Adams v. Cape Industries. 405 Charter had a controlling
shareholding in Cape Industries, which was itself a public listed
company. The plaintiffs argued that Cape Industries had admittedly set
Id.; See generally Pauley Petroleum, Inc. v. Cont’l Oil Co. 231 A.2d 450 (The
plaintiff sued Continental Oil, a Delaware corporation, for an injunction restraining
the Delaware company’s Mexican subsidiary from filing certain lawsuits in Mexico.
The court found that the Mexican subsidiary was an active corporation which held
oil and development contracts with a Mexican government agency and was the actual
operator under some of those contracts. Accordingly, the Mexican subsidiary could
not be said to be the agent of the Delaware holding company).
401 Japan Petroleum Co. v. Ashland Oil, Inc. 456 F. Supp. 831, 846 (D.Del. 1978).
402 Id. at 845.
403 Id. at 846.
404 Id. at 846.
405 Craig v. Lake Asbestos of Quebec Ltd., 843 F.2d 145, 146–47 (3rd Cir. 1988).
401

182

The Mystery of the Corporate Veil

2019

7:1

up a U.S. subsidiary to insulate itself from liability for asbestos claims
and for that reason Charter (its holding company) should be liable for
its debts. 406 The court rejected this argument. 407 This is perhaps not
surprising as Cape Industries was itself a listed company. There is no
case in the United States that has held the shareholders of a listed
company liable for the company’s debts. 408
In reaching its decision, the court reaffirmed the principles
enunciated in Japan Petroleum. The court reasoned that majority or even
total control over stocks is insufficient to warrant piercing the
corporate veil. The factors that should be taken into account in
determining whether an agency or instrumentality relationship exists
include “‘gross undercapitalization . . . failure to observe corporate
formalities, non-payment of dividends, the insolvency of the debtor
corporation . . . , siphoning of funds of the [subsidiary] by the
dominant stockholder, non-functioning of other officers or directors,
[and] absence of corporate records. . . .’” 409
As in DeWitt, the Craig Court conflated both the template and
instrumentality tests. 410 While this approach may not seem doctrinally
pure and may leave the reader in confusion these cases again
demonstrate how interrelated the template and instrumentality
approaches are.
In summary, the instrumentality theory requires a high degree
of control by the parent of the subsidiary. That control must be
exercised by the parent to commit fraud, violate a legal duty, or
perform other unjust conduct. In addition, and significantly, the
unlawful or unjust conduct must be the cause of the Plaintiff’s injury.
In evaluating whether the subsidiary is a mere instrumentality of its

Id.
Id. at 152.
408 See THOMPSON, supra note 5, at 1055.
409 Id. at 150 (citing American Bell, Inc. v. Fed’n Tel. Workers, 736 F.2d 879, 886
(3d Cir. 1984).
410 See id.; DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc. v. W Ray Fleming Fruit Co., 540 F.2d 681,
686–87 (4th Cir. 1976).
406
407
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holding company, the Court may have regard to the various factors
that have been listed above in the template approach.
V. CONCLUSION
The analysis of the case law set out above demonstrates that in
each one of the subject jurisdictions, the general principles applicable
to corporate veil piercing are reasonably predictable. However,
application of the facts to the law in each case is not always consistent.
Corporate veil piercing in every jurisdiction requires the court to do a
balancing act in which it weighs society’s interest in preserving separate
corporate identity against the need to pierce or lift the veil where
observance of corporate forms would produce an egregious result.
Ultimately, outcomes are largely dependent upon the public policy of
the forum at the time when the case comes before it. Pragmatic
recognition of this reality explains why, despite similarities in the
guiding principles in each jurisdiction, the outcome can be very
different where the case is argued in England rather than in the state
of California.
The review of the case law set out above demonstrates that the
legal principles appertaining to piercing the corporate veil are the least
liberal in England. Ironically, though, the factors that should be
considered in evaluating whether to pierce the corporate veil have been
more carefully defined in U.S. jurisdictions. Although South African
courts have propounded a broader and more liberal approach than
perhaps even the American jurisdictions, they tend to follow the more
conservative English approach in practice. However, the recent
enactment of a statutory remedy for piercing the corporate veil is likely
to significantly expand the scope of the remedy in the future.
Enunciating general principles under American law is more
difficult because of the greater frequency of corporate veil piercing
litigation coupled with the fact that corporate law varies from state to
state within the US. However, the general principles across the board
seem to be fairly similar and reconcilable. Statistical variances from
state to state may have more to do with differences in public morality
than any significant legal principle.
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Despite the variances in outcomes between England, South
Africa and the U.S. jurisdictions, one can extract certain general
principles from all the cases that are consistent in all three of the
subject legal systems. The similar general principles in each jurisdiction
include the notion that a corporation has an identity separate and
distinct from its shareholders and, as a general principle, its
shareholders are not liable for the debts of the corporation. 411
Additionally, the jurisdictions share the principle that despite the fact
that the controlling shareholder is a corporation rather than an
individual does not change the outcome. 412 Next, piercing the
corporate veil is not the norm and should only take place in exceptional
circumstances. 413 Further, piercing the corporate veil is a discretionary
remedy. Accordingly, the courts have intentionally avoided defining
the principles in a way that might impose a straitjacket on the courts. 414
Also, the courts in these jurisdictions will pierce the corporate veil
when the company is a sham, a façade or a simulation to enable a
shareholder to carry out an illegal objective, a fraud, or an
impropriety. 415 Moreover, the courts may pierce the corporate veil to
give effect to substance over form 416 and none of the subject
jurisdictions will pierce the corporate veil simply because it is in the

See generally Salomon v. Salomon Co. [1897] AC 22 (HL); Dadoo Ltd. v.
Krugersdorp Mun. Council 1920 AD 530, 550; United States v. Bestfoods 524 U.S. 51, 61
(1998).
412 See generally Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 60–61; Japan Petroleum Co. v. Ashland Oil,
Inc., 456 F. Supp. 831, 841 (D.Del. 1978); Adams v. Cape Indus. [1991] All ER 929
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of India Ltd. v. Evdomon Corp. 1994 (1) SA 550 (A) at 566 C-F; Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at
61–62.
414 See generally Adams v. Cape Industries [1991] All ER 929 at 1025 (Eng.);
Cape Pacific Ltd. v. Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Ltd. 1995(4) SA 790 (AD) at 803
B-C (S. Afr.); DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc. v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co. 540 F.2d 681.
415 See Ben Hashem v. Al Shayif [2009] 1 FLR 115 at 155–56 (Eng.); ; Cape
Pacific Ltd. v. Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Ltd. 1995 (4) SA 790 (AD) at 803 C-G
(S. Afr.); United States v. Pisani 646 F.2d 83, 87–89 (1981).
416 See Daimler Co. v. Cont’l Tyre & Rubber Co. [1916] 2 AC 307 at 315;
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(1981); DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc. v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co. 540 F.2d 681, 685–88
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interests of justice to do so. Other factors must be present. 417 Another
common principle is that fraud is not a necessary element for veil
piercing. 418 Lastly, where a subsidiary company conducts no
independent business of its own and is controlled entirely by its
shareholder, the court may pierce the corporate veil on an agency,
instrumentality or alter ego theory. However, piercing the corporate
veil on this basis requires an unusual level of control by the
shareholder, such that the corporation no longer has any mind or will
of its own. 419

See Ben Hashem v. Al Shayif [2009] 1 FLR 115 at 154 para. 160 (Eng.);
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Lowendahl v. Balt. & Ohio R.R., 247 A.D 144, 154–57 (N.Y. App. Div. 1936), aff’d, 6
N.E.2d 56 (N.Y. 1936); Hamilton v. Water Whole Intern Corp., 302 Fed. App’x. 789
(10th Cir. 2008).
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